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Chapter 1   
 
Ethnicity: comparing inter-ethnic relations and categorisation 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this cross-country comparative report is to provide a meta-analysis of the 
themes and issues examined in the eight background reports on ethnic relations produced by 
teams in October 20081. This will inform a classification of the causes, manifestations and 
functions of ethnic difference in educational arrangements in the context of the varying 
welfare regimes in the participating countries. The cross-country comparative analysis will 
present a comprehensive account of the history and present situation of minority ethnic youth 
with particular concern for drawing together a synthesis of the comparative situation of 
second generation migrants and the Roma. The material presented in section 3 of the country 
reports on ‘Issues of ethnicity in the context of the welfare state’ is primarily concerned with 
matters of policy and these will only be drawn on in this report to support the analysis 
presented in the chapters discussed below.     
  
As the overall project proposal confirmed, the main body of literature which examines ethnic 
identity discusses either macro level processes, policy formulations and effects, or micro-
social settings and the integration of these three levels of analysis is a central objective for 
this report. The proposed three level approach allows the mapping of variations in the 
construction of social status as it is forged through identity formation and empowerment in 
local communities, on the one hand, and through macro-level developments and policies in 
education and employment, on the other. With its focus on the combined effects of macro- 
and micro-level factors, along with individual experiences in shaping identity, this report 
aims to contribute to the advance of an interdisciplinary theory of identity formation. 
 
The persistence, durability and, in some cases, increasing strength of ethnic identities, 
divisions and conflicts across these national contexts is evident. This contextualises the 
growing importance of ethnicity in forging young people’s career paths and life chances, 
despite political, legal and policy interventions to tackle discrimination and target support. 
There are significant variations and differences in migration processes, economic 
development, welfare provision and forms of citizenship here, but these have led to some 
strong similarities in the creation of patterns of ethnic exclusion and minoritisation across 
second-generation immigrants in the western half of the continent and Roma in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The overt and covert mechanisms through which socio-economic, political, 
cultural, and gender relations that make ethnicity a substantive component of inequalities in 
social status and power are examined in this report. 
 
                                                 
1 These reports cover ethnic relations in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
the UK, together with a comparative report on Denmark and Sweden, which constitute the participating 
countries of the EDUMIGROM research project. The reports are, as follows: Schiff et al.: Country Report on 
Ethnic Relations: France; Kusá et al.: Country Report on Ethnic Relations: Slovakia; Magyari et al.: Country 
Report on Ethnic Relations : Romania; Law et al.: Country Report on Ethnic Relations: United Kingdom; 
Katzorová et al.: Country Report on Ethnic Relations: Czech Republic; Ohliger: Country Report on Ethnic 
Relations: Germany; Kallehave and Moldenhawer: Country Report on Ethnic Relations: Denmark and Sweden; 
Dupcsik and Vajda: Country Report on Ethnic Relations : Hungary. 
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In providing a comparative evaluation it is also important to acknowledge both the 
significance of specific contextual settings and the many dimensions of difference and 
diversity in these contexts. Many of the selected countries have long-established immigrant 
communities; in addition some are confronted with a more recent increase in migration. 
There are differences in the ethnic composition of these countries, such as overall size and 
types of ethnic groups, which makes a direct comparison of the countries rather difficult. The 
comparability of data is even more complicated due to different categorisations of groups 
used in the process of data collection, differences regarding the availability of differentiated 
data, and diverse educational systems. In addition, differences in processes of ethnic 
mobilisation and ethnic conflict are likely to be evident. Lastly, differences in intellectual 
traditions, the construction of research agendas and types of research complicate the 
assessment of current ‘cutting edge’ research.    
 
The main aims of the report will be to: 
 
• provide a comparative overview of the working of inter-ethnic relations and the state 
of minority ethnic groups across the nine country contexts 2  
• compare the situation of the selected ethnic minority groups3 across national contexts; 
• compare the nature and extent of discourses, rights, representation and conflicts 
around ethnicity, with particular emphasis on those where the selected ethnic minority 
groups are involved;  
• synthesise existing knowledge on patterns of ethnic relations and identify an agenda 
of under-investigated issues;  
 
Chapter 1 provides a comparative overview of the working of inter-ethnic relations and the 
state of minority ethnic groups across the nine country contexts, together with a comparative 
analysis of the situation of the selected ethnic minority groups, with particular consideration 
given to a wide range of indicators of exclusion, living conditions, poverty and 
marginalisation. It will also address the construction of official statistics on ethnicity, forms 
of self-identification and problems in the comparative analysis of ethnicity data and ethnic 
relations.  
 
Chapter 2 will provide a comparative analysis of laws and regulations on immigration with 
significance for citizenship and the relationship between legal arrangements and multicultural 
values, with particular consideration to the position of selected ethnic minority groups. It will 
also address patterns of political representation for these groups and related issues of 
consultation and conflict. Lastly, it will address comparative processes of ethnic mobilisation, 
civil movements and initiatives, and struggles for recognition by these groups. 
 
Chapter 3 will provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which inter-ethnic relations and 
conflicts are framed in public discourse and related central and local state responses. It will 
examine similarities and differences in ‘hot ethnic issues’ across the different national 
contexts with relevant case studies as appropriate, with attention to the ways in which these 
have been represented and the ways in which the policy context of ethnicity has been framed.  
 
                                                 
2 These countries include the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. 
3 In each country specific ethnic minority groups were chosen for study based on unalterable markers that 
qualify for high probability of being ‘othered’, experience of ‘minoritisation’ along ethnic lines on the part of 
the majority and groups facing high risks of poverty and marginalisation. 
 5
Chapter 4 will synthesise existing knowledge on patterns of ethnic relations, identify leading 
theories and ‘leading edge’ research, using examples, and present an account of differing 
scholarly traditions of researching ethnicity across the national contexts. It will also identify 
an agenda of under-investigated issues in this field.  
 
 
1.2 Why ethnicity matters 
 
Ethnicity refers to the differentiation of groups of people, who have shared cultural meanings, 
memories and descent, produced through social interaction. In classical Greek the terms 
ethnos/ethnikos were used in a number of ways to refer to a collectivity that shares similar 
cultural or biological characteristics, for example a tribe of people or a band of friends, and 
who were not Greek, outside the nation, foreign, different and also inferior, barbarian and 
less-civilised. This distinction between ethnically marked ‘others’ and non-ethnically marked 
‘us’ persists in modern popular usage with references to ethnic fashion, food, music, literature 
and forms of verbal and non-verbal communication. Sociological accounts of ethnicity are 
highly varied but tend to break the classical linkage between ethnicity and ‘other’, in 
asserting that we are all ethnically located in that our subjectivity and identity are 
contextualised by history, language, descent and culture. Ethnicity usually refers to the 
differentiation of social groups on the basis of five distinct criteria. Firstly, a notion of a 
'homeland' or place of common origin is a key element, which is linked to the idea of a 
diaspora, where an ethnic group has migrated from that place to form communities elsewhere 
that identify with their place of origin. Secondly, a common language, either distinctive in 
itself or a distinctive dialect of a language shared with others, may be central to the 
construction of shared memories and affective belonging. Thirdly, identification with a 
distinct religion, e.g. Sikhism, or a religion shared with others can be a central feature of 
many ethnic groups. Fourthly, a common culture with distinctive social institutions and 
behaviour, diet and dress and, fifthly, a common tradition, or shared history of one's own 
'people' or nation are other criteria used in specifying ethnic groups. This last marker, a 
shared history is particularly important for ethnic groups like the Roma. Not all markers are 
used to differentiate all ethnic groups, but identification of the five, or less, criteria provide a 
sound basis for mapping the complexities of ethnic differentiation. 
 
How and why does ethnicity matter? In fleshing out some of the ways in which ethnicity 
matters we need to look closely at specific social contexts. The strength of ethnic loyalties is 
evident in contemporary patterns of ethnic conflict which continue, despite international 
declarations and interventions, creative national policies and inter-ethnic mixing. It is ‘a 
world-wide phenomenon that has become the leading source of lethal violence in 
international affairs’ (Esman, 2004: 26). In organised structure of domination, such as 
exclusionary domination in apartheid South Africa or inclusionary domination such as the 
French Republican model of assimilation, ethnic relations across the globe encompass highly 
varied, complex forms of social relations. Apart from these more formal contexts, ethnicity 
may also be of high importance in informal social contexts (Jenkins 1997) such as: 
 
Primary socialisation: in the social construction of children’s identities encountering and 
learning about oneself, who we are, and others may involve the use of ethnic labels and 
categories alongside other primary identities of gender, selfhood and human-ness.  
 
Sexual relationships and marriage: inter-ethnic sexual relationships have often been a key 
site for violence and conflict, for example in the British race riots of 1919 and 1948, and also 
for aspects of patriarchal power and control which may often be concerned to enforce ethnic 
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exclusivity or group possession of women, for example where a female English Traveller 
may be ‘outcast’ if she marries outside the group.  
 
Routine public interaction: informal ethnic categorisation may often help to organise and 
interpret social interaction. Verbal and non-verbal cues including dress, language, humour and 
verbal abuse may often be key to the expression and mobilisation of ethnic identities and 
group boundaries, who is part of my group and who is not. Everyday cultural ignorance, 
miscommunication and misrecognition of difference, where individuals coming from two 
contrasting ethnic communities may bring with them different value assumptions, 
expectations, verbal and nonverbal habits that influence social interaction and communication, 
may result in offensive behaviour, affronts to dignity and lack of respect which can all lead to 
ethnic conflict and violence. 
 
So, the extent to which ethnicity matters may be highly variable dependent on society, time 
and context, but it is arguably ‘a basic universal facet of the human cultural repertoire’ 
(Jenkins 1997: 77). The leading contribution of Modood’s work on ethnicity is widely 
acknowledged and his theoretical position is located as a bridge between political theorists of 
multicultural citizenship, including Parekh (2005) and Kymlicka (2009) and the long 
established tradition of sociological investigation of post-imperial migrant settlements in 
Western Europe. He emphasises five key dimensions of ethnic difference. These include: 
 
Box 1.1 Dimensions of Ethnic Difference 
 
1. cultural distinctiveness (norms and practices such as arranged marriage),  
2. identity (affective meanings that may motivate or demotivate),  
3. strategy (differential responses to a set of circumstances that may contribute to group 
consciousness),  
4. creativity (group innovations e.g. clothing styles) and, 
5. disproportionality (differential structural characteristics e.g. unemployment). 
(Source: Modood, 2005: 189) 
 
The purpose here is to capture both the subjective and objective features of a group defined 
by descent, and there is a central concern here to explore why certain social contexts over-
determine or reduce the significance of ethnicity and the ways in which the different 
dimensions of ethnic difference may be operating in local circumstances. These issues are 
examined below in relation to the ethnic groups selected for analysis in this study. 
 
1.3 Selected ethnic minority groups and inter-ethnic relations 
 
The nature and complexity of relations between the movement of people (migration), the 
formation of boundaries between groups of people who have shared cultural meanings, 
memories and descent (ethnicity) and the formation and negative treatment of racial groups 
(racism) is a key focus for this study. Two key forms of ethnicity are examined in this study: 
migrant workers and their descendants forming strong ethnic communities, for example 
Turks in Germany or Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK, and the Roma. This study is 
broadly concerned with comparing the situation of indigenous Roma in four Central and 
Eastern European countries with the situation of second generation migrants in five Western 
European countries. But, as the choice of selected minority groups shows, it is also concerned 
to identify how ethnicity and education operate across a range of different social and political 
contexts. Firstly, the situation of the Roma is examined in both Eastern and Western Europe, 
as the UK study also sets out to explore Gypsy and Traveller perceptions and experiences. 
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Secondly, post-colonial migration flows to Europe are examined with a focus on a varied 
range of groups including North Africans, Black Caribbeans and Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
groups, which have differing patterns of educational achievement. Thirdly, other migrant 
groups including the Vietnamese, a cross-Communist migration flow, two guest worker 
migration flows from Southern Europe (Portuguese) and Turkey, and a refugee group, the 
Somalis, provide further detailed exemplars for the analysis of ethnicity. 
 
Box 1.2 Selected Ethnic Minority Groups 
 
Country Selected Ethnic Minority Groups 
Hungary Roma 
Slovakia Roma 
Romania Roma 
Czech Republic Roma, Vietnamese 
UK Black Caribbeans, Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Gypsy/Roma/Travellers 
France North Africans (Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians), Turks 
Germany Turkish, Lebanese 
Denmark Pakistani, Somali 
Sweden Multi-ethnic community in Stockholm 
 
 
The migration history of each of these groups, and the resources and networks they have 
established, provide a set of key contextual factors that are likely to have a significant 
influence on patterns of educational achievement, together with the structural context of 
provision and discrimination. In examining this range of ethnic minority groups, it is to be 
expected that national, ethnic and intra-ethnic differentials in social, political and economic 
location and patterns of achievement will be significant and the complexity of positions and 
trends is important to capture, particularly for the purposes of policy intervention. Super-
diversity is a concept that foregrounds a level and kind of ethnic complexity surpassing 
anything that has been previously experienced (this has been applied to the UK by Vertovec, 
2006). This is distinguished by a contrast with previous periods of migration and 
identification of the dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small 
and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated 
and legally stratified immigrants. This concept is employed here. It is also important to 
identify structural dynamics at the transnational level, the articulation of global market forces 
within local networks and transnational forms of political identification and action, as seen 
for example in the construction of European Roma identity, agencies and agendas. Although 
the mobilisation of ethnicity is operating differently across these groups examined here there 
may also be commonalities in forms of negative treatment and majority hostility.  
  
Negative treatment: the commonality of discrimination and hostility 
 
There has been an accumulating mass of research evidence from the 1960s onwards which 
has sought to both establish an evidence base and win social and political recognition for the 
reality of mundane everyday racial discrimination in Europe and elsewhere across the globe. 
The response of many governments and their politicians and policy makers has been 
ambivalent ranging from denial of the significance of discrimination to pro-active recognition 
and intervention. Reaching ‘square one’ on this issue, i.e. recognition, has been a long and 
arduous task, let alone building a platform of successful interventions to tackle these 
fundamental problems. Here, the compatibility between, on the one hand, racial and ethnic 
exclusionary practices, and on the other, institutional behaviours, environments and 
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objectives may be one key link in explaining their durability and persistence, rather seeing 
these as the exceptional, unwitting or warped attitudes of isolated individuals. General trends 
in racism and discrimination in a range of EU member states were examined in fieldwork 
with 11,000 respondents from ethnic minority and migrant communities between 2001 and 
2005 (FRA 2006a). This shows that a significant number of migrants in all twelve countries 
examined4 have subjectively experienced discriminatory practices in their everyday life, with 
many being particularly vulnerable to such exclusionary behaviour in the spheres of 
employment, housing, education and in interactions with the police. This high level of 
everyday, often casual, racial discrimination and the resulting perception across many groups 
and communities of systemic hostility may have a range of significant effects including 
alienation. The report also highlights a significant gap between the amount of experienced 
discrimination and the rate of reporting such discrimination to public authorities. This 
observation points to the theme of the availability and profile of institutions registering acts 
of discrimination. It may be that many victims either have no opportunity to report instances 
of discrimination, or are not aware of existing possibilities. About one third reported 
experiences of discrimination in employment including harassment at work, refused access to 
jobs and differential treatment in promotions.  About a quarter reported harassment on the 
street, on public transport and by neighbours with 15 per cent of migrants saying they had 
been the victim of violence or other types of criminal offences. One in five reported being 
denied access to either restaurants or discotheques and discriminatory treatment in restaurants 
or shops because of their ‘foreign background’, even including being denied entry to a shop. 
In the context of private commercial transactions just under 30% reported that they had 
experienced discrimination in settings of commercial transactions being denied access to 
housing, credit or loans. In institutional contexts, every sector investigated in this study 
uncovered a significant level of experiences of racial discrimination across these European 
countries. About one in four had been subject to discriminatory treatment by the police in the 
last year and slightly less in educational establishments. One in five experienced racial 
discrimination in interactions with providers of welfare benefits and with employment 
agencies with slightly lower rates in healthcare and social service institutions. Across these 
differing national contexts targets and levels of discrimination vary widely. In Belgium for 
example Moroccan, Turkish, Congolese and Chinese people were key targets of 
discrimination with employment at 37% being the sphere with the highest level of perceived 
discrimination. In Germany, Black people were key targets with 57% reporting that they felt 
they had been denied a job for racist reasons, and in institutional contexts such as education 
the average rate of perceived discrimination was twice as high as for other groups such as 
Turkish people. In France over half of people from the Maghreb (North Africa) reported 
racial discrimination in access to jobs with slightly higher levels of discrimination being 
reported by people from Central African backgrounds. Lastly and most worryingly 86% of 
those who had experienced discrimination did not report these incidents which indicate a gulf 
of trust between minorities, migrants and public and private institutions in Europe. For this 
study, the finding that about a quarter of migrants reported perceived racial discrimination in 
education indicates the necessity of examining this sphere and assessing ethnic differentials 
and their causes.  
 
A further study of the attitudes of majorities to ethnic minorities (FRA 2005) provides a set of 
data on racial and ethnic hostility for our selected countries; UK, France, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, see table below. 
                                                 
4 The countries included in this study were Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and UK and migrants groups selected for study came from a range 
of backgrounds, being those especially affected by racism and discrimination, including Black Africans, Turks 
and those from Arab countries.  
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Table 1.3 Racial and ethnic hostility by selected country 
 
Country % hostile to the 
formation of a 
multicultural 
society 
% opposed to civil 
rights for legal 
migrants 
Aggregate hostility 
ranking 
Germany 34 48 1 
Denmark 22 41 2 
Hungary 18 50 3 
Slovakia 28 38 3 
UK 20 48 3 
France 22 40 3 
Czech Republic 39 21 7 
Sweden 12 34 8 
Romania 12 15 9 
(Source: FRA 2005)  
 
This data indicates that firstly, there is a substantial level of popular hostility towards ethnic 
minorities, towards the formation of a multicultural society and towards the granting of 
migrant rights. Secondly, there is wide variation between the countries under scrutiny here 
with no consistent pattern differentiating Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe, 
which are indicated by for example the wide variation between the Czech Republic’s level of 
hostility to a multicultural society (39%) and Romania (12%). There is however, a tendency 
for opposition to migrant rights to be higher in Western Europe, with the exception of 
Hungary where the level of opposition is at its highest (50%). The aggregate ranking 
combines both of these sets of data and indicates three groupings of countries; very high 
levels of hostility in Germany and Denmark, similar and slightly lower levels of hostility in 
Hungary, Slovakia, UK and France, and lastly moderate levels of hostility overall in the 
Czech Republic, Sweden and Romania. The key drivers of majorities’ attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities were identified here and they include immigration (the actual and perceived 
numbers of asylum seekers, refugees, legal and illegal migrants together with immigration 
control and border policing), Europeanisation (the role of new Member States and their 
citizens in the EU, and future accession of other countries to the EU), global conflicts (the 
impact of on-going and recent global conflicts on relationships between populations within 
the EU – such as the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Israel/Palestine conflict, Iraq and 
Afghanistan), and lastly new policies of diversity and multiculturalism (the increasing 
recognition and promotion of diversity in different aspects of social/public life; public 
information about immigration, citizenship and cultural diversity). Majority concerns and 
anxieties over immigration, threats remain a long-standing factor terrain for the construction 
of racist and exclusionary discourse. The resurgence of defensive forms of nationalism as a 
reaction to processes of globalisation, and the 'de-centring of the West' which has been linked 
to shifting economic and power relations, are processes which have led to the undermining 
and fracturing of national identities in late twentieth century Europe. In addition, the renewed 
debates over nationalism in the face of Europeanisation are seen as highlighting the criteria 
for citizenship, belonging and identity and providing political and cultural space for the re-
articulation of racist discourse. Also,  international hostilities including 9/11, 7/7 and the War on 
Terror, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other conflicts which may be driving the movement of 
asylum-seekers and refugees may all be relevant here in increasing local tensions and perceptions of 
insecurity, threat and risk. Lastly, hostility to inclusionary policies of various types has 
developed, often portrayed as majority resentment over unfair preferential treatment of ethnic 
minority groups.         
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There are a complex, wide-ranging set of causes and motivations for racial and ethnic 
hostility and related violence. Identifying potential factors which make this more likely, more 
acceptable and more durable involves consideration of a complex set of interlocking 
environments.  
 
• Virtual environment, internet sites and networks which may be influential in encouraging 
hostility and violence  
 
• International conflicts and events including ethnic and racial conflicts, acts of terrorism, 
which heighten local perceptions of insecurity and fear and which are used to rationalise 
racist violence 
 
• National political and media messages on migration, ethnicity and racism which shape 
racial hostility   
  
• Economic factors including patterns of unemployment and low pay, economic decline, 
exclusion from new economic opportunities   
 
• Educational factors that make hostility more likely such as patterns of underachievement, 
exclusion, racial and ethnic segregation, lack of explicit focus in schools, failure to 
challenge racism through school curriculum and ethos 
 
• Family factors where hostility is socialised and legitimated across generations and 
genders, with old/young, female/male attitudes and talk promoting hostility in different 
ways    
 
• Local social/ community factors, such as the balance between conflict ‘preventors’ and 
‘promoters’, and the level and nature of social interaction across ethnic/racial lines 
 
• Adult / youth factors, active local cultures/sub-cultures, values and norms of peer groups 
which may encourage hostility  
 
• Activities of ideologically driven groups, e.g. far right groups, who encourage and 
promote hostility. 
 
The macro, meso and micro contexts which collectively frame majority responses to migrants 
are highly dynamic with for example, changing migration flows, global conflicts, media 
images and national debates, yet the levels of racial and ethnic hostility reported by the FRA 
(2005, 2006a) appear to have remained relatively stable over the last decade. Changing times 
and environments play out across a fixed hard core of entrenched patterns of racial and ethnic 
discrimination and hostility.       
 
The formation of ethnic boundaries: the Roma and anti-gypsyism 
 
The long history of discriminatory treatment of Roma and Travellers, by both states and in 
civil society, has placed these groups as the most vulnerable to racism in Europe. 
Marginalisation, discrimination and persecution have always been defining characteristics of 
the social life of the Roma since their entry into Europe in the fourteenth century. Three 
competing forms of understanding and conceptualising Romani identity have been set out in 
recent debate (Vermeersch 2006), and as the Hungarian report confirms there are no 
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universally agreed objective criteria to determine Roma ethnicity. The Roma have been, 
firstly, identified as a historical diaspora, emphasising common origin and descent of a group 
of people from a military caste in India with a common Romani language now scattered 
across Europe. This ‘deliberate fabrication’ of classic ‘gypsyologists’, Nazi scientists and 
contemporary academics has been challenged for its homogenising exoticism (Okely 1983, 
Vermeersch 2006:14). Secondly, others have argued the Roma can be recognised by their 
affection for travelling/itinerant lifestyles, being marginal in national contexts and having a 
specific set of cultural practices and musical traditions. Yet, movement and migration 
characterises humanity and also most Roma in Central Europe do live in settled communities. 
Thirdly, others have argued that the Roma are genetically related and have biological kinship, 
although this raises the spectre of a return to forms of scientific racism through the use of 
racial and ethnic categories in the construction of genetic and genomic databases and related 
forms of mapping. The lack of agreed criteria for defining Roma ethnicity causes major 
problems for data collection and is discussed below. The Romanian report also identifies ‘an 
identity crisis’ at the level of the Roma population as it is characterised by many internal 
divisions and fragmentations including differences between those who are characterised by 
cultural heterogeneity and by a rigid internal hierarchical stratification, which obstructs 
communication with the outside world, and those who comprise the fragile political class and 
especially the vocal civic Roma society. Trehan and Kóczé (2009) argue powerfully for the 
need to construct grassroots alternatives to the dominant, neo-liberal paradigms within which 
Roma peoples are materially and symbolically captured––paradigms informed both by 
‘older’, dichotomised (‘Occidental’/‘Oriental’) understandings of cultural difference and by 
‘newer’ EU pressures brought to bear on eastern Europeans to prove their western 
credentials, which have only led at times to their further separation from the Roma, or to the 
consolidation of a racialised social order in which they and other travelling peoples are 
ironically fixed in (last) place (Huggan and Law 2009). The Hungarian report identifies a 
growing divide between intellectuals and entrepreneurs and the mass of the Roma population 
living in increasing poverty.  
 
The contemporary vilification, discrimination and hostility faced by the Roma in Europe and 
their selection for total annihilation along with Jews in the Nazi Holocaust arise from their 
positioning as a racial threat to national stability. The Romani people arrived in Europe in the 
1400s, having moved from India in a succession of migrations due to Islamic invasion of 
Asia during the Ghaznavid Empire. The historical roots of anti-gypsyism can be traced from 
this period and some key causes for this specific form of racism have been identified by 
Hancock (1997). These include early associations between the Roma and an Islamic threat 
with terms such as heathen, Saracen, Tatars and Gypsies being used and the equation of 
Roma skin colour with darkness, sin, dirt and evil, with accusations that they were spies, 
carriers of the plague and traitors to Christendom. Exclusivist Roma culture with restrictions 
on contact with non-Roma, combined with their positioning as outside the state, with no 
protective territorial, military or economic strength, has facilitated their treatment as 
vulnerable scapegoats. This treatment included mass murder, enslavement and removal of 
children from families, for example in Germany from 1400 to 1800. By the early 1800s 
Roma were refereed to as ‘the excrement of humanity’ and the ‘refuse of the human race’ 
(Hancock 1997: 7). In Romania, Marshall Ion Antonescu’s pro-Nazi government was 
vehemently anti-minority, and especially anti-Roma. Mass deportation of Roma began, 
particularly of nomadic Roma who were primarily thought to be criminals. Some 25,000 
Roma were thus sent to land captured from the Soviet Union (Transdniestria), in 1942. The 
Romanian People’s Court set up a War Crimes Commission in the aftermath of the war. 
According to the Commission, 36,000 Roma died in Romania during the war, the highest 
number from any European country (although as a percentage of the Roma population it was 
far lower than in countries such as Poland and Germany). After the Second World War 
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socialist governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) engaged in a concerted and 
culturally repressive effort to assimilate and settle the Roma populations. The target was to 
gradually eliminate national differences, but actually this meant the elimination of ethnic 
minorities (i.e. their forced assimilation) (Pons 1999: 28). In all CEE countries, Roma culture 
was considered to be one of poverty and underdevelopment and by eliminating any 
references to Roma, the state denied the specificity of the Roma community. Although 
socialist policies improved conditions by increasing access to education and employment, 
they failed to provide equality of opportunity providing jobs that were mostly unskilled, low-
paying and physically demanding and education marginalising them in the labour market, 
further weakening their access to decent housing, health and education and subjecting them to 
open racism and discrimination. In the 1990s anti-Gypsyism re-surfaced in European 
countries that were facing the prospect of increased numbers of Roma asylum seekers. At the 
same time, Central and Eastern European countries failed to tackle the reasons behind large 
numbers of Roma seeking to leave.  
 
Segregation and discrimination against the Roma is evident in both housing and education. 
Across the EU migrants and settled minorities do generally appear to suffer higher levels of 
homelessness, poorer quality housing conditions, poorer residential neighbourhoods (such as 
shanty towns), and comparatively greater vulnerability and insecurity in their housing status.  
Very serious housing problems include lack of access to basic facilities such as drinking 
water and toilets, significantly higher levels of overcrowding than for other households, and 
exploitation through higher comparative rents and purchase prices.  Persistent difficulties are 
faced by Roma, Travellers, Gypsies and Sinti, and refugees and asylum seekers, across the 
EU in securing adequate basic housing.  There is also evidence of some improvement in 
patterns of housing conditions over time, but relative housing inequalities are highly durable. 
Poor mental and physical health, lower levels of educational attainment and lower income 
levels, together with many other dimensions of social exclusion, also have identifiable links 
with poor housing conditions. In Romania, 52.2% of the Roma were identified as living in 
severe poverty in 2001, infant mortality is four times higher than the total population and 
unemployment rates (28% in 2002) are almost three times the national level. In Hungary, 
80% of the Roma were identified as living in poverty, being less integrated than any other 
minority group. In Slovakia, the Roma have been severely affected by the continuing 
economic depression and their living and housing conditions deteriorated not only due to 
joblessness but also due to the halting of social programmes which ran under the communist 
regime, which together with insufficient political representation, political advocacy of Roma 
interests and comprehensive welfare programmes has led to general deterioration in their 
living conditions and life opportunities. These trends are evident across all CEE countries. 
 
The Roma population in Europe is disproportionately young, due to both a relatively high 
birth rate and a short life expectancy. The parents of Roma children who are starting school 
today already belong to the generation that have never been permanently employed in their 
lifetime, and this circumstance heavily influences these children’s opportunities of further 
education. (Kertesi and Kézdi 2005). Some Roma children receive no formal education at all, 
particularly in Romania for the nomadic groups in remote parts of the country, due to 
ongoing racial discrimination and processes of exclusion, and those that do attend may suffer 
racist humiliation and physical abuse by their teachers and peers. Also very few Roma will 
ever learn, in school, about Roma culture, history or language, or about the rich contributions 
Roma have made to the societies in which they live (ERRC 2008, OSI 2007). Enrolment and 
attendance in primary education is low in most European countries and absenteeism is a 
persistent, common and serious problem affecting all Roma and Traveller pupils. Transition 
to secondary education is low and dropout rates increase with age, as a result of both moves 
into employment and low levels of educational attainment. Indirect discrimination in 
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enrolment resulting from differential application of bureaucratic regulations requiring proof 
of residence status, or other documentation not readily available, and direct discrimination by 
open refusal of school authorities to enrol Roma and Traveller children have been well 
established (FRA 2006b). Punishing Roma and Traveller pupils by placing them in classes 
lower than their age group, largely as a result of erratic attendance, academic failure or 
temporary abandonment of school has also been found, which prevents peer group 
integration, has a demoralising effect and can result in higher dropout rates. Formal and 
informal practices of segregating Roma and Traveller pupils persist, despite strategies and 
policies that have been developed to combat them. Although systematic segregation no 
longer exists as educational policy, segregation is practised by schools and educational 
authorities in a number of different, mostly indirect, ways sometimes as the unintended effect 
of policies and practices and sometimes as a result of residential segregation. 
 
Wider patterns of anti-Roma hostility in relation to education are also evident. In Bulgaria, 
86% of respondents in a 2005 Gallup Poll, said they would not want their children attending 
school where more than half the children were Roma. This partly explains government 
failures to implement school desegregation programmes. In Hungary, general anti-Roma 
hostility was reported by about 37% in 2003, with increasing levels of hostility up to the 
present and it therefore affects a large section of Hungarian society (OSI 2007). In Romania, 
research conducted by the National Council for Combating Discrimination in 2004 showed a 
significant level of discrimination in relation to employment, authorities and schools. In 
Serbia, discrimination has been identified as one of the key obstacles to equal access to 
education for Roma. In Macedonia, a UNICEF report on the Situation Analysis of Roma 
Women and Children states that 80% of people polled apply negative stereotypes to the 
‘Gypsies’ (OSI 2007). In the Czech Republic many common people still equate Roma 
distinctiveness with biologically inherited shortness.  
 
The Czech Republic is the only non-Western country where detailed examination of the 
relative position of the Roma in comparison to another minority group is the subject of study 
in this project. The Vietnamese group arrived in this country as a Communist guest worker 
flow from the 1950s onwards, and then later through family reunification and as illegal 
migrants and asylum seekers. Low levels of unemployment characterise this group which 
together with excellent educational attainment sets this group apart from the position of the 
Roma, despite having higher levels of social closure with relatively low levels of inter-ethnic 
marriage for example.       
 
The Roma and other selected ethnic minority groups 
  
Outside Central and Eastern Europe, the Gypsy and Traveller population is also being studied 
as part of the UK project and here this group appears to be both in the most vulnerable 
position of economic, political and social marginality of any ethnic minority group and 
subject to continuing hostility and discrimination, although data for this group is much more 
limited (Cemlyn and Clark 2005). Analysis of the position of the other selected groups in the 
UK shows that the Black Caribbean population tends to be economically disadvantaged and 
socially assimilated, in terms of cohabitation and marriage patterns, and with some significant 
degree of political incorporation; and the Bangladeshi population tends to be in a position of 
greater economic marginality and poverty, with more social distinctiveness, due partly to 
social closure, and less political incorporation (Peach 2005, Modood 2005). Both of these 
groups had the right to settle in the UK, to acquire citizenship and participate in electoral 
politics due to previous British colonial relations and obligations (Robinson and Valeny 
2005). So within the UK, comparative analysis of ethnicity indicates that the Gypsy and 
Traveller groups, who are a part of the Roma diaspora, despite centuries of residence are 
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doing worse, particularly for example in educational attainment than more recent migrant 
groups. A similar picture emerges in both comparing the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe 
with post-colonial migrant groups examined here including North Africans (Algerians, 
Moroccans, Tunisians) in  France, and guest workers such as Turks in Germany and France. 
The population of North African origin and the Maghrebian second generation (the Beurs) in 
France have high levels of social marginalisation and racial hostility. Whereas the Turkish 
group of migrants tend to have lower levels of cultural integration and inter-ethnic relations 
of marriage and friendship than North Africans, and also high failure rates at school. In 
France, about 50% of Turks and 45% of North Africans (less for women) have no school 
qualifications. Turkish migrants to Germany came as guest workers from the mid 1950s 
onwards subsequently settling, establishing a permanent presence with increasing levels of 
intermarriage. Ethnic differentials in education remain striking with 23% of Turkish students 
failing to achieve school qualifications compared to 1.5% of non-immigrants. In Denmark, 
Somali migrants are primarily a refugee group and have the lowest levels of educational and 
labour market outcomes, with Pakistani migrants, a guest worker group, occupying a better 
position, but still showing a considerable level of ethnic inequality in comparison to the 
majority population. Although broad comparative patterns of ethnicity can be identified, there 
is still considerable difficulty in carrying out systematic comparison of the relative position of 
these groups. The purpose of primary research by the country teams involved in this project is 
to facilitate such a comparison through production of relevant quantitative and qualitative 
data. For the German case, “patterns of ethnicity” are hard to substantiate. The focus on 
“Turks” comprises pupils with Turkish citizenship who may well consider themselves Kurds; 
or as well Alevi - in ethnic terms. Any use of given statistical data is in fact of limited in 
respect of ethnicity because we do not use this category to quantify (see below: German 
category “migrant background”). 
 
 
1.4 Categorising ethnicity  
 
The problem of identifying the Roma population has led to the use of variously termed 
methods (hetero/ascription/outsider/external-identification) in addition to census self-
assessment. In Romania data on ethnicity is obtained through the national census using self-
definition. The real number of this minority remains more or less hidden to the authorities, 
partly due to the traditional tendency to be an untouchable ethnicity.  Ahmed et al. (2001) 
notes in a study using hetero-identification that about 10% of the respondents who self-
identified as non-Roma were designated as Roma by interviewers. Here, the external 
characteristics of an individual affected the probability of being hetero-identified as Roma: 
residence in a (perceived) majority Roma/Gypsy settlement, low level of education 
(elementary or less), number of people in the household and low income. Residence in Roma 
neighbourhoods increased this probability by twelve times, the lack of education around three 
times, and poverty and agglomeration each around one and half times. The tool of ‘Roma 
Social Mapping’ has been developed (Sandu 2005) to improve data collection. This uses both 
Roma and non-Roma local informers to identify compact local communities and estimates of 
population size are then made, without attributing ethnic identities to individual respondents.  
 
In Hungary, similar problems of data collection on ethnicity arise, this position is described 
as  “statistical chaos” (Kocsis and Kovács 1999: 13.) caused by the legal prohibition of the 
registration of ethnicity as well as the methodological difficulties of defining “who is a 
Gypsy” which creates serious difficulties for research. The lack of objective criteria to 
determine Roma ethnicity has led to a reliance on census self-identification data, and 
identification by outsiders with the both methods being the subject of intense debate and are 
highly contested. Current approaches seek to combine these methods whilst maintaining that 
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everyone has a right to decide their own identity. In Slovakia, a similar problem of census 
under-enumeration exists. During the 1990s, several administrative bodies surveyed 
(externally attributed) ethnicity and collected data on kindergarten attendance, births, 
infection diseases and criminal cases, but such practice has now ceased. Sociographic 
mapping of Roma settlements was carried out in 2003-04 and has brought about the most 
precise information about the residence and habitation conditions of the Roma population. 
This was based on local expert interviewing (such as mayors and other municipal 
representatives, teachers, priests and like) and done in 1,087 towns and villages (38.4% of all 
in Slovakia) and has been processed into a typology of Roma communities according to their 
level of disadvantage which has been used in various official classifications and policies. 
Currently discussion about implementing legislation to facilitate collection of ethnic data is 
underway. In the Czech Republic statistical data on the Roma are generally not reliable and 
the problem of Roma non-declaration of ethnicity also persists. Here, nationality is a key 
identifier which permits the production of more reliable data on the Vietnamese minority as 
they appear to have no major concerns with self-declaring as Vietnamese nationals. The 
unreliability of data on the Roma has led to the use of proxy categories such as socially weak, 
disadvantaged or excluded, but there is a poor fit here as at least half the Roma population do 
not live in localities containing concentrations of socially excluded people.      
 
In the UK no national census data on European Roma has yet been collected, although 
discussion is taking place about possible inclusion in the 2011 census. Since 2003 data has 
been collected in schools and Gypsy/Roma and Travellers of Irish heritage are two distinct 
ethnicity group categories within the School Census. The Gypsy/Roma category includes 
pupils who identify themselves as Gypsies, and/or Romanies, and/or Travellers, and/or 
Traditional Travellers, and/or Romanichals, and/or Romanichal Gypsies, and/or Welsh 
Gypsies/Kaale, and/or Scottish Travellers/Gypsies, and/or Roma. It includes all children of a 
Gypsy/Roma ethnic background, irrespective of whether they are nomadic, semi nomadic or 
living in static accommodation. The Travellers of Irish Heritage category are either ascribed 
and/or self-ascribed and include: Minceir, Travellers, Travelling People, and Travellers of 
Irish heritage. Travellers of Irish heritage speak their own language known as Gammon, 
sometimes referred to as ‘Cant’ and which is a language with many Romani loan-words, but 
not thought to be a dialect of Romani itself. The school census guidance explains that for 
children aged up to 11, those with parental authority should make the decision on the ethnic 
background of the child. Children aged 11-15 should make this decision with the support of 
their parents. Young people aged 16 and over can make the decision for themselves. 
However, an individual's perception of their own ethnic identity is considered sensitive 
personal data and ultimately it is the 'data subject', i.e., the pupils who determine their own 
identity by ethnic group. For children aged 11 and above, it is the child's decision that matters 
and should take precedence over that of their parents. In the event of a significant 
disagreement arising either between parents or between parents and their child over ethnic 
identity, the matter should be referred to the relevant government department. When a parent 
fails to return the ethnic group collection form, the school can use its best judgement to 
determine the ethnic group of the pupil. This process is also known as 'third party' ascription. 
If ascription is to be carried out then the information should be requested from the parent by 
post along with a letter that explains that the school will ascribe an ethnic group to their child 
if there is no response and parents do not formally refuse to provide this information. If a 
formal refusal is made, schools must not ascribe an ethnic group. Parents should be informed 
of the school's decision and given the opportunity to see, amend or remove the ethnic group 
record. The ethnic group record will be marked as 'ascribed by the school.' If the school has a 
confident belief that the children in question are likely to be, or have a Traveller heritage, 
then they should be encouraged to declare it within the context of the ethnic group 
completion form, but only after establishing, through diplomatic questioning, whether they 
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agree to subscribe to the ethnic status of either Gypsy/Roma or Traveller of Irish Heritage. 
The historic social status of Gypsy/Roma and Travellers of Irish Heritage has been negative 
and there may well be some parents who feel that they are protecting their children by not 
declaring their ethnic background. In these circumstances, every encouragement and 
reassurance should be given to these families by carefully explaining the value to be gained 
for the child from the exercise. So, clear guidance is in place for dealing with the difficulties 
that may arise in ethnic monitoring and the rights of the ‘data subject’ are prioritised.  
  
Danish, Swedish, German and French data is very limited with no collection of information 
on self-declared ethnicity. These countries rely primarily on identification of country of birth, 
lines of descent and citizenship status. For example in Denmark the ‘immigrant’ category 
refers to people who were not born in Denmark and whose parents were not born, or are not 
Danish citizens. So, the Pakistani and Somali groups and their descendants are defined by 
both nationality and whether they are Danish or foreign citizens. The Roma cannot be 
identified in Denmark in national data. In Sweden the only way to identify ethnic origin is 
through information of place of birth or citizenship. Here, the Roma are an officially 
recognised minority group of 40-50,000 people. In Germany, similar problems arising from 
reliance on citizenship and country of birth data has led to a wider debate which has led to the 
creation of a new category, ‘persons of migrant background’, which was included in the 2005 
micro census which roughly doubled the count of migrants and included identification of 
second-generation migrants. In France, legal regulations prohibit the collection of data on 
ethnic or racial origins but there is recent debate that may lead to relaxation of these laws. So, 
data in this country also draws on citizenship and country of birth to identify immigrants and 
their descendants. Also, in Germany and France it is not possible to identify the Roma 
population. In the UK measurement and classification of ethnicity in national statistics began 
in 1976, prior to this proxy measures such as country of birth and nationality were used. The 
national decennial census, the Labour Force Survey and the four national surveys of ethnic 
minorities conducted by the Policy Studies Institute provide benchmark data sources, together 
with local education authority data, the school pupil census and excellent national data sets 
on entrants to higher education providing more detailed information on education. The lack 
of consistent cross-national data on ethnicity remains a key problem for social research in this 
field. 
    
 
1.5 A post-ethnic world?  
 
How should we understand the meaning of racism and ethnicity in a post civil-rights, post-
apartheid, post-colonial, post-national, post-racial, post-communist world? Up to 1990 in 
Romania, but also in the entire communist world, scholars and political actors considered that 
the importance of ethnicity must decline along with the development of modernisation and 
homogenisation. But, as this report confirms, racism and ethnicity are not in decline, and 
many sociologists have been wrong in predicting their demise, including Max Weber,  
 
‘Weber may be criticised along with almost every other social thinker from the time of the 
French Revolution to the outbreak of World War 1 for failing to give sufficient weight to 
racial, ethnic and national conflicts’ (Stone, 2003:29). 
 
The strength of racial and ethnic loyalties and their practical adequacy for many people in 
making sense of their position in the world, in pre-modern, modern and contemporary times 
indicates the likelihood that such conflict will continue, despite international declarations and 
interventions, creative national policies and inter-ethnic mixing. The level of ethnic and 
cultural diversity in a society does not have any significant effect on the likelihood of racial 
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and ethnic conflict and associated violence and genocide (Lattimer 2008). This thesis draws 
on quantitative longitudinal analysis of a range of causal hypotheses (Harff 2003) and 
provides an empirical challenge, particularly to national political discourse which seeks to 
either control or reduce migration, or reject the creation of multiethnic and multicultural 
societies in the name of reducing racial and ethnic conflict. Whereas factors such as the 
habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for 
human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular 
groups and, in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing are all much more likely to 
increase the likelihood of violence and atrocities being committed. The multiplicity of groups 
under threat and the complexity of these contexts indicates the importance of both 
recognising the global significance of the forces of ethnicity, racism and migration and 
developing a wider understanding of these issues across a range of regional situations. As 
Ulrich Beck (2006) reminds us, the increasing development of inter-cultural and inter-ethnic 
social relations across modern societies has been identified by a range of intellectuals and 
scholars including Kant, Goethe, Marx and Simmel, who all saw the modern period as the 
product of a transition from ‘early conditions of relatively closed societies to ‘universal eras’ 
[universellen Epochen] (Goethe)’ of societies, marked by economic and social 
interdependence together with increasingly complex patterns of movement and cultural 
interaction. The resulting swirl of social change has brought into being two opposing 
positions. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism brings with it an emphasis on openness to 
others, recognition and acceptance of difference and the universalist view that all are equal 
and everyone is different. Whereas anti-cosmopolitanism, which can be found across all 
political camps, organisations and countries, emphasises hostility to , linguistic and cultural 
differences, and promotes exclusion of and contempt for racial, ethnic or cultural groups who 
are perceived as threatening in some way. These opposing forces are both central features of 
the European tradition and of twenty first century Europe and provide the context for micro 
inter-ethnic interactions in educational and community contexts for this study. The advocacy 
of post-national cosmopolitanism as liberation from the binding and wearisome attachments 
of locality, ethnicity and nationality has also been the subject of recent debate (Habermas 
1998, May et al 2004). Advocacy of complex, hybrid identities, global polis and citizenship, 
and the transcendence of the nation-state are some of the key elements of a post-national 
politics. Here there is a tendency to both underestimate the opportunities for participation in 
multi-national cosmopolitan politics, and the value of belonging for many people. The 
solidarities on which people depend whether family, community, clan or group can be too 
easily dismissed, especially as these solidarities may form the central basis for struggles of 
the less privileged (Calhoun 2004). 
  
Across the EU, and particularly those member states under investigation here, there are 
commonalities of experience. All of these groups have been subject to racism, xenophobia, 
hostility, violence and practices of restriction and exclusion during the process of migration 
and settlement. They have also been subject to varying levels of political and cultural 
recognition, acceptance of racial and ethnic difference, inter-ethnic marriage and cohabitation 
and incorporation into political, economic, cultural and social spheres of activity. Many of the 
states under scrutiny here have strong national discourses which emphasise tolerance of 
minorities, but empirical evidence shows that interethnic relations are sharply competitive 
and conflictual, particularly in Romania for example in comparison with other Central-
European countries (Culic-Horvath-Lazar-Magyari 1998). The rising ‘ethnicisation of 
politics’ in Central and Eastern European countries and the return to ‘aggressive 
majoritarianism’ (Gillborn 2008) in Western Europe are indicative of these trends.    
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Chapter 2 
 
Comparing Minority Rights and Issues of Representation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide a comparative analysis of laws and regulations on immigration with 
significance for citizenship and the relationship between legal arrangements and multicultural 
values, with particular consideration to the position of the selected ethnic minority groups for 
empirical research. It will also address patterns of political representation for these groups 
and related issues of consultation and conflict. Lastly, it will discuss comparative processes 
of ethnic mobilisation, civil movements and initiatives, and struggles for recognition by these 
groups.5 
 
Legislation on minorities is not the equivalent of legal provisions securing minority rights. 
The latter category refers to a specific group of characteristically collective rights that protect 
and promote minority identities, languages and cultures, in accordance with the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (1992), and other relevant international and European 
normative documents. The subject of such rights are, thus, primarily groups (i.e. national 
minorities), and secondly members belonging to such groups. This body of rights contains 
only a broad formulation prohibiting discrimination, in order to secure equality before the law 
and equal protection by the law for members of minorities (Framework Convention, Articles 
4 and 6).  
 
The regulation of ethnic minority affairs in general covers a much more extensive area, 
including immigration, integration and citizenship policies as well as actions to combat 
discrimination, equal opportunities policies, affirmative actions, and a set of welfare 
regulations. In these matters, a wide range of international and European agreements and 
conventions apply, setting the norms for the protection of human, civil, political, and social 
rights.6 Given the nature of our project (addressing issues of discrimination and segregation) 
and the peculiar situation of the ethnic minority groups in question (subjected to multiple 
disadvantages), it appears useful to approach our subject matter from a broad perspective, 
comprising all sorts of policies affecting minorities. 
 
 
2.1. Precarious paradigms: integration, multiculturalism and citizenship 
 
Our central concern is to examine the ways in which issues of ethnic and cultural difference 
as well as social and political inequalities are addressed in particular contexts. The following 
discussion compares some of the basic paradigms of national political approaches and 
debates with respect to ethnic and cultural diversity. The conceptualisation of ethnic 
minorities and the development of related regulations and policies are largely determined by 
the make-up of the society in question, produced by its historical experiences and memories, 
                                                 
5 The analysis provided here primarily draws on the data and statements provided in the background country 
reports (WP3) of the EDUMIGROM project listed in footnote 1. Specific references to these reports are 
indicated only occasionally. 
6 For the general normative framework of the protection of ethnic and national minorities and details about anti-
discrimination legislation see section 2.3. 
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which are fused into a kind of ideologised image of itself.7 While such notions stand for a 
point of departure for public policies in general, and policies on minorities in particular, their 
implications should be regarded with caution, as they often contradict actual practices derived 
from the central paradigm, or disregard the unintended consequences or utter failure of 
certain policies.8 What is more, seen as theoretical models, ideological formulations in 
themselves may be inconsistent or ambiguous. 
 
Almost all the countries participating in our research are multi-ethnic societies. However, this 
fact is evaluated and represented in a variety of ways, suggesting differing modes in the 
treatment of ethnic minority groups/communities. Even post-colonial societies show basic 
differences with respect to the vision of ethnic and racial diversity and the acceptance of their 
own status as immigrant countries. Both British and French societies have developed from 
complex historical migration, and experienced periods of conflicts, conquests, empire and 
decolonisation. Nevertheless, while the United Kingdom recognises itself as a multi-cultural 
and multi-racial society and adopts the normative understanding of cultural pluralism, French 
republicanism strongly opposes any form of differentiation and resists the public recognition 
of ethnic groups. Thus the United Kingdom aims to nurture and foster diversity as a means to 
secure the equality of citizens, while the national ideology in France is that of assimilation, 
based on the idea that cultural conformity and a relatively open access to citizenship should 
be sufficient to prevent inequalities in the treatment of individuals belonging to ethnic groups. 
At the same time, both countries – like any other European states – apply increasingly tight 
and selective controls on immigration, show strong protectionist tendencies concerning the 
access to long-term residency and the labour market, and struggle with difficulties in terms of 
the inclusion of 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants.9 In addition to social inequalities, 
immigrant groups are subjected to xenophobia and racism (as discussed above in Chapter 1). 
Thus the ethnicity (and race) issue arises in universalist France, stubbornly denying its 
political relevance officially and using euphemisms in public discourse (“immigrant” for 
“non-white”), just like in self-consciously “super-diverse” Britain that overstresses its own 
                                                 
7 There are a number of internationally significant events and periods that have left deep marks in collective 
memories and thus are still very influential. The most outstanding historical factors shaping state and societal 
ideologies, relevant for the approach of minority issues, include colonialism, the second World War, the Cold 
War and state socialism. Tentatively, the major effects of these historical events and periods can be summarised 
like this: A sense of guilt has emerged as an effect of the colonial past and involvement in World War II in some 
of the concerned states. Post-colonial states like the United Kingdom and France have developed a notion of 
responsibility towards post-colonial minorities, affecting their attitudes towards more recent immigrants as well. 
State policies and ideologies. especially in France and Germany but also in East and Central European countries 
that were aligned on the side of Nazi Germany during World War II, reflect a great deal of uneasiness regarding 
the acknowledgment of ethnic differentiation. The Cold War produced paternalistic attitudes in Western Europe, 
and frustration and a desire to catch-up on the other side of the iron curtain. Finally, the ambiguous legacy of 
state socialism have generated a kind of amnesia, indifference and lack of solidarity towards, and responsibility 
for, disadvantaged minorities. 
8 Ideologically informed and constrained approaches to minority issues are loaded with taboos and 
underinvestigated problems. Thus they are often too rigid to acknowledge and address long-term difficulties, or 
respond adequately to emergent needs. At the same time, a paradigm may hold itself even in the face of 
accummulating contradictions, that is, when actual occurrences and practices are not consistent with it. 
9 Leaving behind the age of relatively liberal immigration policies, especially targeting post-colonial minorities, 
both states have adopted a tough stance on immigration. British government policy regarding the rights of, and 
provisions for, immigrants is essentially conservative and still has strong racial implications. Direct controls on 
immigration are complemented by restricting recourse to public funds, reducing the benefit rights of asylum 
seekers and tightening job search requirements. As for integration, the performance of France is in contrast to 
this, depending on the dimension in question. In international comparision, it is the highest country regarding 
anti-discrimination but has the worst score in terms of the admissibility of foreigners to the labour market 
(Migration and Integration Policy Index 2007). 
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multicultural character, as if it was a novelty, as well as the significance of cultural and racial 
differences.10 
 
Where immigration is a more recent phenomenon, like in the case of Sweden and Denmark, 
coherent immigration and integration policies exist only since the 1990s. In spite of this 
commonality, there are huge differences in self-conceptualisation between the two countries, 
pointing, again, to distinct political and ideological traditions. Both states are representative 
of the integrationist Nordic welfare model, the universalism of which is recognized for its 
strong understanding of social equality, yet often criticised for being susceptible to cultural 
uniformity. Yet, while Sweden defines itself as an ethnically and culturally diverse society, 
and its multiculturalist politics have been seen as a role model for the integration of 
immigrants, Denmark stubbornly tries to avoid becoming a multicultural society by 
demanding the acceptance of “Danish values” from ethnic minorities. Danish immigration 
law is more restrictive than the Swedish one, and the process of naturalisation is extremely 
long and complicated. Migration and integration have been particularly controversial issues 
in Denmark, provoking criticism both nationally and internationally and leading to changes in 
relevant legislation.11 Denmark places a particular emphasis on inculcating language and 
culture and national history (similar requirements apply for the introductory period in France 
and Germany as well) besides demands regarding self-supporting capacities as conditions of 
naturalisation (which, in turn, is alien from the French system). In contrast, integration is 
conceptualised as a mutual process in Sweden, heading towards the full participation of 
ethnic minorities in a diverse society (a concept that is close to the British approach and also 
accepted as the standard interpretation in the European Union). At the same time, both 
Denmark and Sweden respond to the challenges of the “new economy” (characterised by the 
introduction of new technologies and the lack of qualified labour) by a change of welfare to 
“workfare” approach in state policies (Christiansen & Markkola 2006, Esping Andersen 
1990). This shift involves tying social benefits to work and other duties, which comes 
especially hard on disadvantaged and discriminated minority groups that are statistically 
more dependent on welfare and less able to find employment. Alongside concerns about 
welfare expenditures and the spread of neo-liberalism, the present transformation of the 
Nordic model also entails underlying assumptions regarding ethnic minorities that “do not 
want to work” and “should contribute something in return” for social support.12 Such notions 
tend to be backed by arguments referring to distinct (and unwelcome) cultural traits, and 
function to cover the reality of discrimination. Thus the workfare approach to integration, 
practically leading to new modes of exclusion, serves dominant political interests also by 
placing the responsibility for low employment rates onto “culturally distinct” immigrants.13 
 
With respect to the acknowledgment of its own situation as an immigrant society, Germany 
stands for a case in between the two poles represented by the United Kingdom and Sweden, 
at one end, and France and Denmark, at the other. Germany considers its ethnic fabric an 
unintended by-product of having become a country of immigration, which fact has been 
recognised officially only recently (in the Immigration Act of 2005). The country’s 
                                                 
10 For a discussion on the ’incomplete nationalisation’ of British culture and the historical significance of 
cultural and racial differences see Miles 1993. 
11 Important legislative developments include the modification of the Aliens Act in 1997 and the passing of the 
Integration Act in 1999, both of which aimed at reducing immigration and improving the basic system for 
integration. Subsequent regulations introduced further restrictions (e.g. the so-called 24-year (or minimum age) 
requirement, preventing marriage under this age). 
12 The Coppenhagen Integration Policy is a case in point. 
13 A Foucauldian strand of research in Scandinavia (e.g. Hvenegård-Lassen 2007, Mik-Meyer 2004) examines 
how public discourses are producing understandings of ethnic minorities as different, problematic, unrealistic 
and unwilling, thereby legitimising exclusionary and restrictive practices according to dominant interests. 
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intelligentsia made efforts to promote a multiculturalist agenda in the 1980s, which was 
largely discarded by a recent shift towards integration. Criticism of multiculturalist policies 
for promoting separated ethnicities has increasingly led to promotion of policies favouring 
cross-ethnic loyalties and values.  Like the two Scandinavian states, Germany developed a 
coherent immigration and integration policy only from the 1990s on. Immigration into the 
country became relatively easier, especially for selected groups (like students, investors, or 
highly skilled immigrants), while the acquisition of citizenship – tied, besides other 
conditions, to passing a test on culture, history and politics since 2008 – has recently been 
made complicated again. Legislation on citizenship and naturalisation is in the midst of 
substantial transformation, too, the most important aspect of which is the introduction of an 
element of jus solis in a system previously characterised by the exclusive validity of the jus 
sanguinis principle (allowing now children of legally residing foreigners to automatically 
obtain German citizenship upon birth). Nevertheless, the German concept of citizenship still 
emphasises the place of birth, which exacerbates ethnic divisions between Germans and 
‘foreigners’ (who may have lived in the country for several generations). In initiating a 
variety of socio-economic, political and ethno-cultural changes immigrants should undergo in 
order to become part of the receiving society, the ‘ethnically blind’ integration policies also 
indicate a sense of unease and anxiety over increasing ethnic and cultural diversity in 
Germany. 
 
Immigration being a recent and relatively insignificant phenomenon, the approaches of 
Central and Eastern European countries to ethnic and cultural diversity is conditioned, first of 
all, on the presence of historical national and ethnic minorities. Tensions in inter-ethnic 
relations are owing to, on the one hand, conflicts around state formation and the repeated 
redrawing of borders during the past century, the memories of which are deeply ingrained in 
identities and attitudes due to the rise of nationalism and ethnicism in post-Socialist times. On 
the other hand, the complex transformation of these societies since the fall of state socialism 
has brought a series of social, political and economic problems to the surface, leading to the 
intensification of the “Roma issue” as the primary concern of integration policies. Despite 
their historical multi-ethnic composition, multicultural ideals are weakly represented in 
Central and Eastern European societies, However, language legislation in Slovakia or 
Romania, as well as the 1993 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary point toward 
the formal recognition of multiculturalism. Insensitivity towards the fundamental 
acknowledgment of diversity may be conceived as a result of the multiple impacts of political 
regimes of the 20th century. Primordialist views of ethnicity of the pre-war era and the 
imposition of uniformity by Communist ideology (coalescing in a blend of nationalist 
Communism that primarily characterised pre-1990 Romania but, to a lesser degree, other 
state socialist regimes as well) underpin the framework of reference of inter-ethnic relations 
as well as minority politics in the region.  
 
The concept of citizenship, also central in Central and Easter Europe, is not as 
comprehensive, and its actual contents are less elaborate than in Western European states. 
The integral elements of citizenship – especially civil and political rights – are less 
developed, insufficiently enforced and often misinterpreted and misused due to the 
immaturity of civil society and the impotence or negligence of the state. As a result, 
violations of basic human rights are relatively frequent and not easily detected and remedied. 
Ethnically differential conceptions of aspects of citizenship are evident, just like some 
Western welfare states. What is more, the ‘ethnic’ character of citizenship (i.e the 
understanding of social membership based on ethnic criteria) predominates in the CEE 
region, as opposed to the overall ‘civic’ conception of citizenship characterising western 
societies. 
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Thus, although citizenship is the prevailing principle in governing social relations in post-
socialist states as well, formally secured rights are not enforced equally towards all national 
and ethnic minorities. (In Hungary Roma are considered an ‘ethnic minority’, while in other 
countries of the CEE region they are regarded as a ‘national’ minority). This causes 
disadvantage particularly for the Roma populations, while informal and unwritten rules and 
relationships tend to take over the management of affairs. This weakness, coupled with the 
low degree of understanding regarding the principles of equal treatment and equal 
opportunities, contributes to widespread discriminatory practices against the Roma. With 
view of their significantly limited access to legitimate rights and public services, it is often 
affirmed in Central and Eastern Europe that Roma are actually classified as second rate 
citizens. This remark may refer to different practices in individual countries, involving more 
or less obvious infringements of rights. However, with respect to the precarious nature of 
citizenship in the case of Roma, the common sources and make-up of problems seem to have 
more significance than the differences in their appearance. Most significantly, although there 
may have been differences in the intensity and articulation of ethno-nationalism in transition 
states, depending on the democratic credential of early governments as well as the success of 
economic reforms and general economic prosperity, this tendency seems to be quite 
ubiquitous now, considering that any Central and Eastern European states appear to be prone 
to fall into a “spiral of ethnic politics”.14 
 
In sum, the legacies of previous political regimes and experiences related to immigration and 
multiculturalism are filtered through the self-conception of societies in terms of ideals of 
diversity as opposed to uniformity, as well as according to dominant understandings of 
citizenship. It is through such ideological constructions that historical trajectories of 
contemporary liberal democracies contribute to setting the conditions of minority politics. 
The recognition of ethnicity, as we have seen, is conditioned, first of all, on ideological and 
intellectual premises, which – either by overestimating or by underestimating it – seem to 
evade, in one way or another, the actual implications and significance of ethnic difference for 
the minorities in question. The dominant Eurocentric norms influencing state policies and 
public attitudes may be identified as the general underlying cause of this kind of evasion or 
partial blindness concerning minority issues, affecting ideas and practices in all European 
states. At the same time, as a result of ideological differences between individual states, 
similar challenges posed by immigration and ethno-cultural diversity may lead to different 
kinds of responses, though fundamental problems appear to have much in common. And, vice 
versa, divergent historical trajectories and ideological backgrounds may give way to similar 
formulations in policy-making regarding the protection of minorities.15 
 
The following section provides an overview of integration agendas – as the backdrop of 
securing minority rights – in connection with the social position and perception of ethnic 
minorities. 
 
 
2.2 Status and perception of ethnic minorities – challenges of integration 
 
Ethnic minorities are engaged in processes of inclusion and integration and are differentially 
incorporated into various spheres of society, depending on their (actual or perceived) 
attributes and the local context. Societies with many immigrant groups are characterised by 
great ethnic complexity, resulting, on the one hand, from diversification and stratification (the 
                                                 
14 The authors of the study alluded here concluded, in 1997, that this tendency was characteristic of Romania, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria. (Vachludova and Snyder 1997, p. 14.) 
15 Issues of integration and minority politics are expanded in the following sections (2.2 and 2.3). 
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emergence of social and cultural differences between and within ethnic communities) and, on 
the other hand, from differing forms and degrees of inter-ethnic communication leading to the 
mixing of communities and the formation of multiple and hybrid identities. Such 
developments are also characteristic of post-socialist societies. Processes of social integration 
and ethnic interaction are promoted or hampered by majority or host societies, depending, 
firstly, on their political visions and, secondly, on their interests and actual capacities. 
 
Integration, as opposed to inclusion, is a political priority in virtually every state under 
discussion. This goal is approached in a variety of ways and has been accomplished to 
various degrees and in different dimensions (namely, with respect to language, culture, 
education, labour market, and politics). In this regard, the ethnic minority group in question – 
its immigration history and present position vis a vis the majority society – is highly relevant, 
just like the dominant approach of the concerned state. Though integration policies are 
different, and they target individual groups differently, the underlying assumptions and 
expectations form a more or less comprehensive theory that is shared by European states. In 
short, mainstream policy tends to assume that ethnic minorities are culturally different and 
need to undergo some degree of acculturation. The hopes related to such (typically simplistic) 
normative conceptualisations, however, often remain unfulfilled. For instance, instead of 
progressive and extensive assimilation, leading to the elimination of all differences, France 
has experienced segmented assimilation, suggesting that integration processes in different 
dimensions are interconnected in a highly complicated manner, so that cultural 
accommodation does not necessarily involve any improvements in the socio-economic 
dimension (Portes and Zhou 1993). On the contrary: groups characterised by a significant 
degree of cultural separation (like the Turkish minority) may be relatively prosperous, while 
culturally more assimilated ones (like North Africans) are much more disadvantaged 
economically and socially. Another example is provided by the fate of Roma, who have been 
treated with varying levels of tolerance and refusal over history, facing several periods of 
persecution, and ending up as the most outcast ethnic minority in all the European countries 
they have ever appeared. Although they repeatedly underwent (often forced) assimilation, 
Roma have maintained their ethnic characteristics, owing to resistance and survival strategies 
employed in the face of social rejection and hostility. At the same time, their social separation 
is also due to the effective denial of the opportunities of assimilation on the part of majority 
societies. These examples suggest that integration policies tend to be misconceptualised and 
misconceived, even counter-effective or directly detrimental, implying the necessity of their 
revision from the point of view of the interests of particular minorities and the norms of 
social inclusion, equality and participatory parity. 
 
As for the ambitions of states regarding the integration of minorities, it can be asserted that – 
even though this possibility is officially ruled out – (perceived) ethno-racial characteristics 
are of great importance.16 Besides other factors – like the historical connection of the 
                                                 
16 Restrictive immigration policies since the 1980s or 1990s tend to hinder possibilities for family reunification 
and immigration by marriage. Such policies are based on a normative (and Eurocentric) conception of family 
and marriage as well as stereotypes and prejudices regarding immigrants, which has provoked serious 
controversy (especially regarding Denmark). Furthermore, the mere fact that while immigration, integration and 
community cohesion policies are controlled centrally but implemented locally in virtually all countries suggests 
the peripherialisation (and thus the lack of control) of the issue of racism. Decisions about the provisions to 
newcomers during the transitional period of application are transferred to the local level. Thus in Denmark and 
Sweden municipalities, and in the United Kingdom local authorities and community relations agencies take care 
of the management of inter-ethnic relations. Likewise, in CEE states decisions concerning the entitlement for 
welfare benefits are made by local welfare assistance agencies. Another illustration of the point about covert 
racism is provided by the notorious arguments with reference to the ‘basic problem’ with immigrants, i.e. their 
lack of relevant classifications and skills in explaining their social exclusion, whereas widespread forms of 
racial discrimination and exclusion in both education and employment operate also. This kind of 
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minority group with the host society, the time and circumstances of immigration, the intensity 
of internal and external community relations and interest-enforcing capacities, creating 
considerable variation – the imputation of “cultural” difference on the part of the authorities 
and institutions of host societies strongly determines the course of, and opportunities for, 
integration of an ethnic minority. Within this framework, the treatment and opportunities of 
ethnic minorities are largely determined by their economic, social and political functions. 
More specifically, they are valued for their actual contributions in case there is a demand for 
their labour and services, and refused, mistreated or (in the case of Roma) even subjected to 
persecution when they are no longer needed. As a rule, restrictive regulations on immigration 
and discriminatory policies and practices, emerging when there is no need for labour supply, 
go hand in hand with increasing policing and reduced access to public services and welfare 
provisions. This state of affairs, practically leading to social exclusion, also implies processes 
of racialisation, as the underlying agenda is stopping non-white immigration and the 
restraining of welfare resources from ethnic minorities having a “distinct lifestyle” and “not 
deserving” support. 
 
The political function of ethnic minorities is more complex and versatile: roles of ethnicities 
range from active or passive participation in nation-building processes (representing a 
positive contribution to multiculturalism or the outsider negative “other”) to acting as a (risk) 
factor in national politics (as a potential partner or an actual or perceived threat) and 
international relations (for instance, during decolonisation processes, in post-war settlements, 
or in the course of the accession process of Central and Eastern European states to the 
European Union). Thus the political/symbolic significance of ethnic minorities is not at all 
overlapping with their social and economic usefulness in the eyes of majority societies. 
 
A simple periodisation of the history of immigration since the second part of the 20th century 
seems helpful in understanding the changing attitude towards immigrant groups, particularly 
those from outside Europe. Post-war labour immigration (partly determined by post-colonial 
and guest-worker arrangements), was followed by migration on account of marriage and 
family reunification, alongside the arrival of several waves of asylum seekers.  Obviously, as 
long as they were seen as providing a solution to labour shortage, immigrants were welcome. 
However, they were deemed undesirable as soon as becoming superfluous labour force as a 
result of economic transformations (specifically the reconfiguration of the industrial sector). 
A parallel dynamic may be discerned in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, too, Roma had 
relatively better opportunities of social membership in the post-war period of reconstruction 
(also owing to ideological reasons, namely the equalising and uniformising premises implied 
in the state socialist notion of social membership), while the economic transformation of the 
early 1990s, causing massive unemployment, revealed their precarious situation.  In fact, 
though Roma came to Europe several centuries ago, their case manifests several similarities 
with more recently arrived non-European (and non-white) immigrant groups in terms of 
representing a serious problem of social integration and even regarding their citizenship 
rights.17 What is more, in terms of social standing and acceptance, the situation of Roma 
seems to be worse than that of  any other ethnicities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
misinterpretation of problems, involving the transference of responsibility onto the victims, also holds for the 
case of Roma. 
17 Roma usually have the same citizenship rights as the majority, however, these are not enforced to the same 
extent. This is especially true in Romania, loaded with a dark history of Roma slavery, and the Czech Republic 
that was unwilling to grant citizenship and residency to Roma migrant workers and their families after the split 
of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (unlike Slovakia that accepted those Roma who were expelled from the Czech 
Republic). 
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On the one hand, it is at the moment when an ethnic minority group loses its relatively stable 
position in the social network and economic structure of society that the political urgency 
regarding ‘the need to promote integration’ arises. On the other hand, the political concerns 
resulting from the perceived otherness of minorities, distinguished on account of origins, 
language, culture, religion and/or outward appearance, represent a direct challenge for 
integration. In the meantime, in constituting a set of constraints and opportunities, inducing 
processes of accommodation, assimilation, or even social exclusion, integration policies 
effectively transform the characteristics of ethnic groups and their relations with the rest of 
society in an intricate manner. For all these reasons, the interests and claims of ethnic 
minorities are quite different. Differences arise not only due to the historical constitution and 
present situation (in both national and transnational contexts) of groups but also as a result of 
complex transfigurations provoked by the various policies they have been subjected to. 
Nevertheless, ethnic and national minorities are subjects of a quasi-unified framework of 
international and European regulations of minority rights. This framework not only sets the 
norms of the appropriate treatment of minorities but – through related policies – also induces 
further changes in the conditions and opportunities, social regard and self-conception – 
therefore, the very nature – of individual ethnic groups. 
 
 
2.3 Minority rights  
 
“Classical” minority rights concerning culture, language and identity 
 
With the exception of France that is not a signatory, all the states covered in this analysis 
have ratified both the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and adopted them in their national 
legislation in the second half of the 1990s or during the early 2000s. Thus, in theory, they 
have paved the way for promoting and protecting the rights of ethnic and national minorities 
regarding the maintenance and development of their culture, preservation of their identity, 
religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage, as well as enhancing their freedom of 
association and participation in resolving matters of their concern, and allowing the use of 
their language in public, particularly in education and in communication with authorities and 
the courts. Based on the fundamental principle of human rights, the conventions stipulate free 
optional membership in a minority and prohibit assimilation against the will of persons 
belonging to national minorities. 
 
As a result of the implications of the dominant ideology of individual states, there is a sharp 
divide between the United Kingdom and Sweden, on the one hand, where such principles 
have been introduced well before their pre-eminence in international norms, and France and 
Denmark, on the other, where assimilationism is still a leading tendency in politics. Thus 
there are five recognised national minorities in Sweden, and the first policies promoting the 
equality of minority languages and cultures started in 1975. During the past years, Sweden 
has taken important steps to advance the protection of national minorities, providing public 
support to Finnish and Sami language media programmes and other cultural initiatives. 
Denmark, in turn, has only one recognised national minority and does not consider the issues 
of minority languages and cultures a priority. The United Kingdom developed the liberal 
approach termed “race relations” policy already in the mid-1960s, founded on the ideas of 
cultural pluralism and emphasising racial and ethnic differences within a human rights 
paradigm and community relations framework, first oriented by the principle of racial 
harmony and later that of racial equality. In contrast, France does not recognise ethnicity at 
all in its legislation and policy-making (see the section on categorising ethnicity in Chapter 
1). Nevertheless, it shows certain regard for religious plurality, manifested, for instance, in 
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the creation of a “French Islam” since the 1990s. Germany has accomplished little so far with 
respect to the protection of minority languages and cultures, since claims for cultural or 
territorial autonomy have not yet even been raised by its minorities (including the large and 
well-organised Turkish minority). At the same time, problems with implementation – due to 
the generality of formulations, as well as the ad hoc adaptation of the English law – result in 
a lack of clarity and limited recognition of cultural diversity even in the United Kingdom. 
Separate and distinctive treatment and regulations of affairs of distinct minorities is revealed, 
in particular, by the fact that the extent to which religious practices become controversial and 
are seen as appropriate for legal intervention is highly variable across religions: those used by 
marginalised minority communities to express their identity and as a territory to play out 
conflicts are more prone to lead to criticism and restrictions (Poulter 1992). Global issues, 
like the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, and the responses provoked by them on the part of 
European states, have also significantly changed attitudes towards Muslim minorities. In the 
field of minority politics, this change may be detected through the issue of wearing the veil. 
(See more on this issue in chapter 3 of this report.) 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, where ethnicity has traditionally represented a prominent 
issue (even though it was suppressed during state socialism), multiculturalism (though not in 
the contemporary sense of the term) has been a key reference point in state policies, its 
implications being sometimes recognised and at other times contested throughout history. At 
present, particular minority rights are recognised in national constitutions (like in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, where they are included in a constitutional act since 1968) as well as 
in charters (in the Czech Republic) and separate acts (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary). Characteristically, these states have developed specific legislation to secure the 
rights of national minorities, elaborating and adopting minority acts during the 1990s. Such 
endeavours were motivated at first by the regime change and the intention to obtain 
international reputation for the new democracies (especially in Romania and Hungary), and 
later by the imminent accession to the European Union (like in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia). Legislative and policy-making processes were often informed by political 
considerations falling outside of the genuine responsibility of the state towards its own 
minorities, and contradicting the interests of the concerned minorities, thus provoking 
criticism for being concerned merely about crisis management and appearances, thus 
representing a kind of “politics on display” (Kovats 2001).18 Furthermore, power relations in 
the national context, i.e. the presence of powerful and territorially concentrated ethnicities, 
also had a determining influence on the course of negotiations and final outcomes. In 
particular, the Hungarian minorities, striving for cultural and even territorial autonomy in 
Romania and Slovakia, played an important role in this process, although with differing 
results: in Slovakia, a separate legislation on minorities was developed, while in Romania, 
this issue has not yet been settled so far.19 As a matter of fact, where legislation on minorities 
                                                 
18 For instance, while Hungary was appreciated for being the first state in the region to introduce a law on 
national and ethnic minorities (in 1993), this deed as well as the formulations of the act reflect “alien” interests. 
The legislative process, driven by the desire to gain the recognition of Western Europe, was also motivated by 
notorious concerns related to the fate of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, which constitutes a 
token issue in national politics. This is reflected in the design of the system of minority self-governments, 
provided for in the act, which disregards the specific problems, concerns and conditions of the Roma 
population. The categorisation of the Roma as an “ethnic” as opposed to “national” minority in Hungary is 
already suggestive of differences in their treatment as a minority. 
19 The Act on Minority Language Use was finally adopted in Slovakia in 1999, curtailing the impacts of the 
previous Act on the State Language of 1996. In contrast, the hazardous career of the draft law on minorities, 
determined both by the growing influence and the strategic concerns of the Hungarian Coalition Party as part of 
the government during two consecutive cycles (from 1996 to 2004), did not lead to the adoption of the act that 
was deemed futile and detrimental for creating new tensions. Instead, a step-by-step approach was adopted, 
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is in place, it does not fully comply with European normative regulations and is also criticised 
for the elasticity of its formulations (like in Slovakia and Hungary). Inadequate 
conceptualisations in setting the agenda, particularly with respect to problems concerning the 
participation of minorities in decision making, as well as the lack of sufficient remits to 
support newly established institutions, significantly hamper the implementation of minority 
rights. In other words, the restrictive application of norms and laws precludes the genuine 
recognition of minorities (curtailing their opportunities to receive public financing for 
projects), and their full scope of rights (particularly those related to political participation) are 
not respected. As a result, nationalist approaches survive in these institutional frameworks, 
albeit in a covert form. At the same time, overt nationalism is also manifest in public and 
policy discourses, particularly concerning the Roma populations (see more on this in Chapter 
3). 
 
In sum, there have been significant developments regarding classical minority rights, 
especially during the past one and a half decades but also looking back on a long tradition in 
certain societies. However, existing frameworks have deficiencies even in states with an 
elaborate framework of minority rights, and the enforcement of regulations and policies is 
generally insufficient, leaving space for ongoing struggles. Consequently, this issue 
represents the subject of repeated conflicts and tensions, continuously feeding minority and 
majority efforts to reach (temporary) consensus. 
 
Anti-discrimination legislation 
 
The elimination of all forms of discrimination, including discrimination suffered by persons 
on account of belonging to a national, ethnic or religious minority, represents an integral part 
of international and European law. This body of fundamental rights is primarily constituted, 
at the international level, by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) of the UN and, at the European 
level, by the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC), the Racial Equality Directive 
(2000/43/EC) and the Employment Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) of the European 
Union. As it has been emphasised earlier in this chapter, the regulative framework of 
specifically minority rights, though thoroughly informed by the principles of tolerance and 
understanding, contains only a broad formulation regarding the prohibition of discrimination. 
 
As for individual states, the anti-discrimination principle is everywhere included in national 
constitutions, and it is generally reinforced by particular acts and government resolutions as 
well. Such acts and resolutions either govern specific policy areas (like employment, housing 
or education), or have general validity in public policy. The histories of combating 
discrimination and accommodating basic human rights principles being different in each 
country, the level of protections against, as well as consciousness about, discriminatory 
practices is also diverse across Europe. Yet, concerns regarding the implementation of the 
anti-discrimination principles have much in common. A fundamental controversial issue 
regards the inability of formal protections in precluding hidden and indirect forms of 
discrimination. This fact was recognised early in the United Kingdom as well as in Sweden, 
while it is a rising concern in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Denmark, Germany 
and France. 
 
The concern about human rights and equality among citizens emerged relatively early in the 
United Kingdom and France. In conformity with the traditional philosophy of liberal 
                                                                                                                                                        
manifested in individual affirmative action measures to integrate the claims of the Hungarian minority for 
cultural autonomy, including minority education. 
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democracy, both states prioritise individual rights over collective remedies. However, there 
is, again, a fundamental difference between the two states. The British race relations acts 
have been constantly trying to work out effective protections against discrimination since 
1965, by defining (direct and indirect) discrimination and harassment, introducing statutory 
obligations concerning public agencies to eliminate discrimination, prohibiting hate speech, 
and even allowing for positive discrimination. The Commission for Racial Equality, recently 
integrated into the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, as the main responsible 
official body for safeguarding human rights and positive community relations, is entitled to 
start legal proceedings and contributing to legislative developments (like the stimulation of 
equal opportunities policies) and expected to change public perceptions. France, in contrast, 
having a deep trust in the formal provisions of equality embedded in its welfare system, has 
not developed a specific body to initiate and coordinate anti-discrimination regulations and 
policies. At the same time, as against the predominant denial of the relevance of ethnicity in 
social relations and conflicts, there is in France, too, a rising national conscience regarding 
racial and ethnic discrimination, which led to the establishment of the High Authority for the 
Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality in 2004. This independent administrative 
body, however, is devoid of any representative, legal or executive powers, and its functions 
include only the preparation of studies and reports, providing legal advice, conducing 
investigations and counselling the government. 
 
Sweden, where national minorities used to be strongly discriminated against in the past, has 
by today established an extensive system of minority protections. In the past years, Sweden 
has taken a number of important actions in this field, including the development of 
institutional capacities to combat discrimination against Roma and other minorities. A 
commitment to improve minority protection further has been recently expressed in the 
National Action Plan for Human Rights (2006-2009). Discriminatory policies in Denmark 
and the lack of effective protections, especially concerning immigrants, have provoked 
heated national and international controversies (Kallehave and Moldenhawer 2008). 
 
The two EU directives of 2000, mentioned above, gave a strong impetus to develop anti-
discriminatory legislations in the Central and Eastern European states (as well as in 
Germany). Roma representing the primary concern regarding discrimination, the tackling of 
the problem was among the most important criteria of accession to the European Union. In 
accordance with the European model, these countries have developed a compound legislation 
on equal treatment and equal opportunities, complementing and reinforcing existing 
protections (included in constitutional guarantees as well as labour codes, acts on public 
education, etc.). As far as implementation is concerned, official bodies have been established 
in a number of states (e.g. the Equal Treatment Authority in Hungary, or the Slovak National 
Centre for Human Rights) to investigate cases and impose sanctions. Furthermore, the offices 
of parliamentary commissioners (or ombudspersons) of human rights and minority rights, a 
type of institution widespread in the region, also have an important function in monitoring 
cases and formulating recommendations as to the improvement and application of anti-
discrimination legislation. 
 
A notorious problem of anti-discrimination policies (often coming up in the United Kingdom 
as well as in Central and Eastern Europe) relates to deficiencies of enforcement. Besides 
concerns about the inherent problems of legal proceedings (difficulties of proving cases, 
lengthy procedures, etc.), weak sanctions of little restraining power are also often criticised 
(see national background reports: WP3, EDUMIGROM). Furthermore, structural and 
institutional problems arise with respect to the compound and comprehensive nature of 
legislations (covering all sorts of disadvantaged minorities struggling with different forms of 
discrimination) and the excessively wide brief of responsible institutions. An additional 
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deficiency is the lack of affirmative action policies. Though positive discrimination is a legal 
possibility in many countries (not in France or Germany though), it is seldom practised, both 
because of the traditional colour blindness of the liberal approach and due to the strong public 
aversion against, for instance, “privileging the Roma” (see also Chapter 3). As a result, the 
protection against discrimination is not effective even in those states where it is considered a 
political priority (see data on discrimination in Chapter 1). 
 
Accomplishments and ambiguities 
 
The recognition of ethnic minority cultures and languages and the protection of persons 
belonging to minorities form an important terrain of political struggles in virtually every 
state. These goals have acquired prominence either on their own account, or due to other 
political exigencies and interests, including considerations belonging to national and foreign 
politics. The multiplicity of political concerns in the background led to disproportions, 
ambiguities and anomalies in the formulation and enforcement of minority rights. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Roma. 
 
The legislation and policy framework of minority rights in Central and Eastern European 
states were conceived from the point of view of historical national minorities seeking, first of 
all, the promotion of their language, culture and identity. At the same time, the interests of the 
Roma minority were typically marginalised. Although they may formally be part of the same 
institutional structure of minority rights, their specific problems arising from racial hostility, 
discrimination and segregation are not remedied within this institutional framework. What is 
more, in enhancing the relevance of cultural and ethnic differences in community relations 
and as the legitimate basis of self-organisation, the legislation and policies that are in place 
imply further risks for the Roma, given that their characteristic injuries – i.e. discrimination, 
segregation and racism – arise precisely from the imputation of difference. In addition, 
though they may be able (like in Slovakia and Hungary) to obtain public funds to establish 
cultural and educational institutions, start projects, and engage in cultural activities in 
general, as made possible by current legislation, given their disadvantaged social position, the 
Roma can make significantly less use of existing provisions as compared with other national 
minorities. 
 
Besides having been subjected to long-term discrimination and being the target of 
intensifying hostility, this state of affairs is owing to the lack of resources and influence of 
Roma communities. In the absence of a supportive mother state and a wealthy middle class, 
they are completely dependent on public funds in financing activities. In addition, as a result 
of the detrimental effects of previous policies concerning the Roma (especially those 
employed under state socialism), the community relations of Roma have suffered serious 
damages. Such problems related to misrecognition, coupled with the experiences of poverty 
and social exclusion, make the Roma end up struggling with significantly more difficulties 
than other minorities in formulating, representing and promoting their interests. An important 
international initiative to compensate for such difficulties and promote the social inclusion of 
Roma populations is represented by the Decade for Roma Inclusion (2005-2015), a regional 
cooperation agreement of 11 countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to 
improve the social and economic conditions of Roma. 
 
Overall, the issue of ethnic minority rights represents an expanding domain of legislation and 
policy-making. At the same time, there is high variation as far as accomplishments are 
concerned, owing to differences in deeply rooted notions about statehood and the regard of 
specific minorities, on the one hand, and incidental circumstances characterising political 
processes, on the other. The recognition of ethnic minorities represents a dynamic aspect of 
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the entire political process, since related struggles may involve a broad range of claims, 
changing with time and occasionally reaching beyond the original framework of minority 
rights as established by international norms and interpreted by individual states. This 
dynamic process, vowed to be promoted by some states and obstructed by others, may 
become misdirected or even reversed even in culturally open societies, as a consequence of 
global and international events as well as due to structural reasons. Thus the rising political 
concerns about Islam have led to restrictions on religious freedom and the re-interpretation of 
fundamental freedoms and community relations. As for the structural deficiencies inherent in 
minority legislations, it is generally unacknowledged that remedying the problems of the 
most vulnerable minorities – i.e. those exposed to various forms of injustices caused by 
discrimination – requires a complex approach, which, in turn, implies the revision, and 
possibly the restructuring, of the entire policy framework related to minority rights. This 
undertaking is a thorny one, not only given the difficulties in designing appropriately targeted 
policies but also because concerned groups (like the Roma) often lack the power to enforce 
their rights and influence decision making. (See more on the political concerns and structural 
problems related to policies on minorities in chapter 3.) 
 
 
2.4 Political participation and representation of ethnic minorities 
 
As for the distribution of power along ethnic lines, the picture is highly varied across Europe. 
Differences have to do with the characteristics of institutional structures, the political 
priorities and attitudes of majority societies, and the level of organisation and resources of 
ethnic minority groups. 
 
Political rights and representation in official bodies 
 
As long as they are naturalised or nationals, members of ethnic minorities formally have 
equal political rights (regarding voting and organisation of political parties) compared with 
the majority in each state under discussion, since these rights are linked to citizenship status. 
(Consequently – with a few exceptions20 – foreign citizens are virtually excluded from 
politics.) At the same time, it has been generally observed that ethnic minorities have 
relatively reduced access to, and influence in, decision making, especially at the national 
level.21 
 
Electoral and party politics 
 
Members of ethnic minorities, as a rule, are comparatively less likely to vote or to be 
registered to vote, though the level of their interest in getting involved in electoral politics is, 
again, varied according to groups and states. Differences seem to be attributed to the degree 
of the inclusion of minorities in majority institutions as well as to the strength of relationships 
and organisations within the ethnic minority communities. Thus previous colonial relations 
and intra-community ties affect positively the participation of Black Caribbeans and 
Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom, or of North Africans in France. The well-developed 
Turkish community in Germany has been discovered only lately as a constituency in 
                                                 
20 Non-naturalised residents living in the country for more than 3 years are allowed to vote at municipal 
elections in Sweden and Denmark. (This issue has been on the agenda in France, too, however voting rights 
have not yet been secured to foreign residents.) 
21 On the political activity and relatively low level of political participation of immigrants and Roma see 
especially the national reports on ethnicity (WP3) of the EDUMIGROM project and also the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2007). For further analyses of the problem see also Togeby 2002, Kotvanová, 
Szép and Šebesta 2003, National Democratic Institution for International Affairs 2003, etc. 
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Germany, which is due to the fact that before the change of the legislation on citizenship, the 
number of naturalised immigrants was much lower. The attitudes of the majority society and 
politics are also highly significant: negligence and the lack of solidarity create disinterest 
among marginalised minorities. It is a general feature characterising all the societies under 
discussion that most members of marginalised and discriminated minorities (e.g. Roma or 
Muslims) are unable to name a politician or a party that represents their specific interests. As 
long as a minority group is not recognised as a potential constituency on its own right – as is 
the case with Roma populations – its interests remain peripheral in politics, while, at the same 
time, its voting power gets easily abused by politicians. 
 
For the same reasons, the ability of ethnic minorities to run for elected positions is also 
relatively weak and varied. In effect, with the unique exception of Sweden, national 
parliaments fail to reflect the ethnic composition of societies. Minority candidates, if at all, 
are elected from the lists of mainstream parties, rather than of their own. This is inevitable in 
France and Germany, where due to the official non-recognition of ethnicity, the shared 
background and status of particular ethnic groups have not materialised into a common 
marker for political mobilisation and party formation. Another, internal, cause of the 
incapacity of minorities to support their own candidates relates to the lack of unity among 
existing organisations, which is a serious problem faced by Roma minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Successful groups in terms of being fairly represented through majority 
parties (also by creating platforms) include the Turks in Germany, the Black Caribbeans in 
the United Kingdom and selected minorities in Sweden. The major parties created by the 
Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia, in turn, have even been able to serve several 
terms, as a coalition partner, in government, promoting their own interests (like schooling in 
minority language or regional infrastructure) as well as issues that affect other minorities as 
well (equal treatment and anti-discrimination). 
 
The situation of Roma minorities is especially critical with regard to parliamentary 
representation. In Central and Eastern European states a number of Roma were members in 
the first elected democratic parliaments after 1990, however, they have been virtually absent 
there ever since. Part of the reason why majority parties have lost interest in Roma has to do 
with growing intolerance and racism: the fear to lose potential voters in case of nominating 
Roma candidates.22 Even though Roma have been able to form several parties in the region, 
these have never been able to pass the critical threshold and make their way to legislative 
bodies. This is largely due to the fractured nature of the Roma public sphere and the 
difficulties of political leaders in mobilising support. The Gypsy and Traveller community of 
Britain, that used to be characterised by disunity as well, has traditionally been the most 
excluded minority from politics in the United Kingdom. Recently, however, there has been a 
slow improvement regarding the participation of this compound ethnic minority in electoral 
and party politics. At the same time, it still does not have any representatives in the House of 
Commons or in the Welsh and Scottish parliaments. 
 
The situation looks somewhat better at the local and regional levels. This is especially true for 
the two Scandinavian states where, given the right of residents with foreign citizenship to 
vote at municipal elections after 3 years of staying in the country, ethnic minorities are more 
strongly nominated and represented at this level. In France, North Africans managed to enter 
local government structures in the 1990s. There are Roma members of communal 
governments and Roma mayors in Slovakia, and a few Roma have won seats at local 
                                                 
22 At the same time, several Roma candidates in Hungary have been elected members of the European 
Parliament, which indicates a kind of double standard in attributing significance to the democratic norm of the 
political participation of minorities. 
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elections in the Czech Republic. The minority acts of Hungary (1993) and the Czech 
Republic (2001) provide for the establishment of minority self-administration with elected 
representatives.23 
 
It should be noted that the representative of an ethnic minority, even if not promoting issues 
that exclusively concern his/her own group (as is usually the case), tends to be seen as a 
spokesperson of that minority or of the policy goals related to it (like immigration and 
integration). This entails the risk of becoming enclosed in a political ghetto, which has been 
the fate, for example, of some Turkish politicians in Germany. Another typical danger faced 
by minority representatives consists in the occasional attempts of the political establishment 
to manipulate them. As a consequence of such strategies, many North African representatives 
of local administrations in France became isolated from anti-racist social movements. In sum, 
real inclusion in politics presupposes the ability of minority politicians to represent their own 
(or their party’s) agenda, which, in turn, entails a kind of politics of recognition. 
 
Non-elected bodies 
 
With the exception of France, where there are no official intermediary bodies through which 
minorities can express their claims, government and administrative structures have been 
established in each state to deal with the affairs of ethnic minorities and manage inter-group 
relations. In effect, these special representative bodies are primarily functional in 
implementing integration policies. The councils and commissions – operating at national and 
local levels – as well as ministerial departments and government offices have usually merely 
consultative functions, and often both their representative and political values (i.e. power) are 
questionable. 
 
Community relations organisations form an extensive network in Britain, connecting the 
national and local levels, and engaged in advocacy and representation.24 Although the semi-
official status of these bodies has led to conflicts over the extent and nature of participation 
and representation, they have played a significant role in developing the legislative 
framework to combat racial discrimination and implementing community relations policies. 
In contrast, initial efforts to create special representative political bodies for ethnic minorities 
in Germany have had no effects since these function only as advisory boards. By the same 
token, the actual impact of national and local councils, created by the Danish state as 
consultative bodies to the government to deal with integration, has been questioned on 
account of their lack of human and material resources and expertise. In Sweden, too, 
immigrant councils exist in some municipalities, usually having a consultative status, but 
there are a few umbrella organisations as well that have been created in order to establish a 
dialogue with municipalities. 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the framework of ethnic minority politics has been devised 
under external pressure (represented by the European Union), without a real understanding 
                                                 
23 Minority self-governments in Hungary have long struggled with serious legitimacy problems, because (until 
the 2005 modification of the minority act introducing registers for minorities) majority citizens were allowed to 
elect, and even to be elected as, representatives of minorities. Though this issue has been solved, the autonomy 
of Roma self-governments is still deficient: for having comparatively more difficulties in generating funds than 
other minorities, they are too much exposed to mainstream local self-governments through which they receive 
public funding. 
24 Community Relations Councils, renamed as Racial Equality Councils, operate under the Race Relations 
Board and the Community Relations Commission that has been recently replaced by the Commission for Racial 
Equality. 
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and acknowledgment of the problems to deal with. This accounts for many of the deficiencies 
of the institutional design. 
 
In Romania, the Department for the Protection of National Minorities and the National 
Council for Minorities (created to comply with the obligations involved in Council of Europe 
membership) both participated in the preparation of the ultimately failed Act on National 
Minorities. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities includes the National 
Agency for Roma (previously called Office for Roma Affairs), presently having a Roma 
person for president, which is an independent agency having regional offices as well, 
responsible for cooperating with governmental institutions and developing a national strategy 
within the framework of the Decade of Roma Inclusion. Despite all these developments, the 
instruments to implement policies and enforce the rights of minorities remain inefficient in 
Romania. 
 
The main co-ordinating body of Roma policies in Slovakia, the Office of the Governmental 
Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities, was established from a grant of the World Bank in 
1995 to prepare a governmental strategy to advance the situation of the Roma population. 
However, its mission in “dealing with problems of citizens who need special assistance” is 
not backed by sufficient remits. Another concern around the institution relates to its lack of 
representativity: its Proposal of tasks and measures, issued in 1996, was prepared without the 
participation of Roma. At the same time, as a reaction to skinhead attacks against Roma in 
the following years, the Council of the Government for Minorities made recommendations 
for mayors to promote the participation of Roma representatives in the work of municipal 
commissions and local police. 
 
In contrast, there is a rule concerning the composition of membership of the Czech Council of 
the Government for National Minorities, stipulating that 50 per cent of the delegates must 
belong to national minorities.25 This permanent consultative and initiative body (actually set 
up in 1968) – just like other public organisations of minorities – has actively participated in 
the preparation of the Minority Act of 2001 that reinforced its powers. However, the Council 
for Roma Community Affairs, consisting of 15 regional representatives directly appointed by 
the government, has been criticised as non-democratic and also for having no real political 
power as an advisory unit. Finally, there are coordinators for Roma Affairs in each region, 
and Roma advisors and social workers at the municipal level, which indicates that the real 
issue in the Czech Republic – as well as elsewhere in the Central and Eastern European 
region – is conceived in terms of assisting the Roma. 
 
The career of bodies representing the Roma minority has been particularly convulsive in 
Hungary, characterised by ad hoc decisions and influenced by particularistic political 
interests, preventing the continuity and effectiveness of Roma policies. The principal 
government organisation – the Bureau of National and Ethnic Minorities (1990-2007) – had a 
wide range of duties, from outlining a theoretical approach and preparing government 
decisions related to minority issues, to coordinating programs concerning the Roma. It was 
not until 2004 that policy-making and coordinating functions were unified within a single 
body, the Directorate of Roma Affairs, which became invested with significant authority and 
a considerable budget. The office was first headed by a Roma politician who, as ministerial 
commissioner, launched an intensive campaign for integration in education. In spite of such 
achievements, Roma politics is still effectively managed by a host of loosely connected 
offices with unclear responsibilities in Hungary, as indicated by the problematic status and 
weak influence of the National Roma Self-government.  
                                                 
25 The Vietnamese, not being recognised as a national minority, are obviously not represented in this body. 
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In assessing achievements regarding the political participation of ethnic minorities, 
distinction must be made between the formal involvement of ethnic minorities in decision-
making, on the one hand, and informal (political) processes of gaining influence, on the other. 
For instance, in Britain, the heads of community relation agencies are appointed by the 
government, without the formal involvement of minorities in such decisions, which first 
resulted in significant “white” domination. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual shift since 
the 1960s towards increasing leadership, management and participation of Black and 
minority ethnic groups in race relations bodies. At the same time, provisions formally 
securing the participation of minorities in decision making are insufficient in themselves as 
long as the overall participation of the minority population in question is marginal. Individual 
ethnic minority politicians may easily fall prey of cooptation and “divide-and-rule”-type of 
tactics, as it often happens with Roma leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Given the insufficient, or often marginal, opportunities of ethnic minorities to influence 
policy-making, the restructuring of the system of minority representation, or at least the 
introduction of specific positive action-type measures to balance power relations, is of great 
significance.  
 
Remedies to correct disadvantages 
 
The relative lack of political power of ethnic minorities is both a cause and a consequence of 
the inefficiency of mechanisms and instruments securing political participation. Affirmative 
action-type measures to promote and equalise political participation are rarely adopted. 
Instances of specific provisions and actions to empower minorities include the following:  
 
• Voting rights at municipal elections conferred to residents with foreign citizenship 
who have stayed in the country for over 3 years (Sweden, Denmark)  
• Reserved seats for national minorities in the national parliament (Romania) 
• Minority self-administration at the local and municipal levels (Czech Republic, 
Hungary) 
• Training for Roma women in politics (Czech Republic, Hungary)26 
• Formation of all-party parliamentary groups in which MPs work closely together 
with representatives of minority groups and speak on their behalf (United 
Kingdom) 
 
Notwithstanding the significance of such improvements, the power of ethnic minorities to 
influence politics largely depends on their opportunities and abilities regarding the formation 
of pressure groups, rooted in the civil sphere. 
 
Civil initiatives and issues of concern 
 
In general, the right to create grassroots organisations has been the major means for ethnic 
minorities to participate in politics. At the same time, the structure of the civil sphere shows 
significant differences across European states, depending on dominant ideologies that 
crystallise in divergent norms and rules. Thus the political identity of the state (its perception 
of democratic and liberal values) and the legitimate bases for self-organisation (determining 
policies of public funding) greatly influence opportunities for civil organising. Besides the 
impact of institutional opportunities and constraints, the disposition of ethnic minorities to 
create NGOs is determined by the degree of intra-group and inter-group relations and 
                                                 
26 This program was funded by the Roma Participation Program of the Open Society Institute (OSI). 
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solidarity as well as by their wealth. Ambitions to organise for political purposes, in 
particular, depend on the successful formation of collective political identities, and also on 
the ability of groups to create alliances to mobilise around issues of generalisable concern.  
 
The general features of civil societies 
 
For historical reasons, the civil sphere is much more developed and politically influential in 
Western European societies than in the new democracies of Central and Easter Europe. A 
strong sense of citizenship rights, including political ones, and the emulation of anti-racism 
movements were determining factors in the United Kingdom and France. In Britain, large and 
well-organised communities were formed, particularly through the establishment of 
community associations and places of worship, and also through political action.27 However, 
while plural ethnic assertiveness is particularly strong in Britain, leading to an unparalleled 
degree of political mobilisation of ethnic minorities and resulting in significant achievements 
in terms of influencing policy-making, organisations in France, in order to be eligible for 
public support, must show that they do not restrict membership by ethnic or racial origin. 
Nevertheless, France also has a dense network of associations for the promotion and defence 
of immigrant communities, and the right to create grassroots organisations has been the major 
means of participation for minorities. Alongside cultural and religious associations, many 
organisations promote integration and anti-discrimination (in the fields of urban renewal, 
education and prevention of violence). Some of these even function as formal or informal 
partners of the administration. 
 
Voluntary associations, looking back on a long history, are considered a cornerstone of 
Danish democracy and civil society, where the formation of associations among ethnic 
minorities has been shaped by national as well as international political and economic 
conditions. The overall development of ethnic minority associations in Denmark shows a 
movement towards addressing social, economic and political problems that ethnic minorities 
encounter in their daily lives. In contrast, though only a small proportion of the ethnic 
minority population is involved in organisations in Sweden, these are more politically 
oriented. A particular feature of Scandinavian civil society is the importance attached to 
transnational relationships and networks of minorities (e.g. the transnational communities 
created by Turks, Kurds, and Somali). 
 
In Germany, where the organisations of immigrants were not registered at first as such, 
nation-wide organisations are scarce and young. Cooperation between immigrant NGOs and 
state actors is also a fairly recent development, yet already having attained some success: the 
roundtable discussions with the participation of minority representatives have led to the 
adoption of the National Integration Plan. 
 
Civil organisations in Central and Eastern Europe started to proliferate right after the regime 
change. Besides the newly obtained civil rights, there abundance is due to the opening of 
access to public funding, mainly from European and international sources (EU, OSI). As a 
result, numerous single-purpose organisations have been formed (to disappear soon after), 
while only a few of them have managed to survive. The number of organisations engaged in 
advocacy is extremely low, though the repeated criticisms of acceding states by European 
institutions, as well as membership in the European Union (i.e. the introduction of a new set 
of political criteria and the inflow of European funds), have created new opportunities in this 
                                                 
27 For instance, Gypsies and Travellers as a collective entity in the United Kingdom was formed as a result of 
nation-wide mobilisation to campaign for law reform in housing, planning and education, particularly calling for 
access to land for caravan sites and access to schooling. 
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respect. As a matter of fact, issues like anti-racism, anti-discrimination, desegregation and 
integration have, in a sense, motivated civil activity indirectly, i.e. mediated by European and 
international institutions. 
 
A general feature of civil societies in the region is their strong dependence on public funds 
and susceptibility to be influenced by political actors, leading to a relatively reduced (sense 
of) autonomy. For all these reasons, civil society is the subject of continuing debates as for its 
role and significance, as well as the rules and status of NGOs. The general problems of scarce 
resources and defencelessness come especially hard on the exceptionally fractured Roma 
civil sphere that consists of competing, rather than collaborating, entities represents the 
hotbed of perverse phenomena like ’ethnobusiness’. In these circumstances, sympathising 
majority organisations and international organisations (like the European Roma Rights 
Centre) have been more effective in exerting influence on state policies (only marginally 
entering into civil collaborations) than Roma NGOs. 
 
Mobilisation and civil impact 
 
The three major sets of objectives ethnic minorities strive for include ethnic or racial equality 
and justice (in combating discrimination, segregation and racism), social inclusion and the 
improvement of social relations (in promoting policies of integration and equal 
opportunities), and the preservation of national, cultural or religious identity (in promoting 
related legislation and acquiring support for cultural production). From the point of view of 
political participation, activities related to the third set of objectives have a complementary 
function concerning identity formation and mobilisation. While the definition of groups and 
the nature of claims are different in the three cases, all of these broad agendas are able to 
initiate changes both in relations of recognition and of redistribution.  
 
Colour identity seems to be especially suitable for mobilisation purposes and the creation of 
alliances around issues of broad concern (like human rights).28 Mobilisation around national 
or cultural identities, in turn, implies a greater degree of closure in aiming to promote the 
interests of particular groups, though such efforts may have significant impacts on other 
minorities, too.29 The role of religious, particularly Muslim, identity appears to be more 
flexible, as it may be put to the service of cultural, social and political goals as well.30 
 
Social movements started by relatively disorganised and marginalised ethnic minorities are 
often doomed to suppression. When driven by desperation, such movements are unstructured 
and sometimes violent in their form, and typically emerge as a reaction to immediate threats 
(specifically racist conflicts or a sudden deterioration of livelihood).31 Even though ethnic 
and racial issues have been raised by such occurrences, the key identifying factors for 
protesters are provided by their social situation, dependency and marginalisation. Breakdown 
or debility of long-standing movements, in turn, may, in case of a strong connection with the 
                                                 
28 A successful example is provided by Black Caribbeans in the United kingdom, who were at the forefront of 
anti-racism struggles and active in the development of British ’race relations’ politics. 
29 Thus, besides their preservationist agendas, the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia have promoted 
anti-discrimination and equal treatment policies as well. 
30 In Britain, religion is used by marginalised minority communities to express their identity and also as a 
territory to play out conflicts. Muslims represent a well-established lobby, capable of having their demands (e.g. 
for Muslim schools and the gradual introduction of halal food) accepted. Mosques in Germany represent the 
bases of legal and administrative units, also having cultural and social functions. Islamic associations and 
movements in Scandinavia, although frequently the source of heated media debates for their alleged radicalism 
in their understanding of Islam, have fostered religious pluralism. 
31 Two examples are represented by the “hunger strike” of Slovakian Roma after a significant curtailing of 
social benefits in 2004 and the suburbian riots in France in 2005. 
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traditional political structure, be caused by manipulation from outside, resulting in the lack of 
representativity and legitimacy.32 
 
Visibility in the public sphere and the growing significance of ethnicity 
 
Even in countries where ethnic minority organisations proliferate (like Britain), many groups 
are unable to effect any real changes at the national level. This is all the more true for 
countries (especially those of the Central and Eastern European region) with an immature 
democratic institutional framework and a fragile civil society. Overall, the political activity 
and participation of minorities tend to be more intense at the local and regional levels, and to 
be realised through semi-official or informal organisations. General factors inhibiting 
effective political participation of ethnic minorities include the lack of human and financial 
resources, weakness of self-organising and limited local coverage, on the one hand, and the 
insufficiency of mechanisms to remedy these impediments, on the other. 
 
A notorious problem debilitating ethnic minorities concerns weak relations between the elite 
and the rest of the community, and thus between representatives and the (formally) 
represented. The manoeuvres of mainstream politics also generate legitimacy problems, by 
manipulating and co-opting the representatives of ethnic groups. The legitimacy issue arises 
at an institutional level where the appropriate guarantees of meaningful (i.e. legitimate and 
powerful) representation are not built into the system (for instance, in Romania and in the 
case of minority self-governments in Hungary prior to the modification of the Minority Act in 
2005).  
 
With the exceptions of the United Kingdom, Sweden and – to some extent – Germany, 
minorities as groups are not directly involved in decision making processes. The case of 
France is extreme inasmuch as official representative bodies of ethnic minorities do not exist 
at all. As for council-type organisations, as well as minority self-administrations, these 
usually have consultative functions only, what is more, their agenda (like the promotion of 
immigration and integration policies) is mostly set by the majority of society. As a result of 
weak representation, ethnic minorities face serious difficulties in enforcing their interests, and 
their image gets easily distorted. This may be remedied through cultural activism and by 
creating space for alternative forms of representation – even though cultural representations can 
not fully correct misperceptions without adequate political representation. In the worst scenario, 
both kinds of representation are lacking, reinforcing both the misrecognition and non-
recognition of ethnic groups. Thus, for instance, the “Roma issue” appears to be more visible 
than the Roma themselves. 
 
Visibility, however, also has its dark side. For instance, the rise of Muslim political agency is 
generally seen as a challenge or threat to multiculturalism and democratic values. Indeed, the 
mere presence of Arabs, whether or not they practice the Islam, has raised worries in majority 
societies (see Chapter 3). This phenomenon, like any other manifestations of xenophobia and 
racism, indicates that nationality, ethnicity or religion have mobilising power not only for the 
concerned minority communities but also for majority societies and politics. In particular, the 
shift in the public regard of Muslim identity, first seen in religious and later in racialised 
terms, reveals the elasticity of the category of ‘ethnicity’. 
 
Marginalised minorities are bound to represent and promote their interests as nationalities or 
ethnic groups for several reasons. First, in an effort to obtain recognition to heal injuries of 
                                                 
32 Cases in point include the anti-racism movements in France of the 1970s and 1980s (SOS-Racisme, Marche 
des Beurs) and the slowly unfolding Roma movement in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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disrespect. Second, because they are often compelled to do so by the characteristics of the 
institutional structure (e.g. so as to obtain funds and support). And third, in order to respond 
to the requirements and challenges of contemporary political culture in general and appear as 
a potent entity on the political scene. Thus the prevalence of ethnicity, as an important ground 
for mobilisation and a key factor in inter-group relationships, is supported by institutional 
factors as well as persisting nationalism and ethnicism. As a result, ethnicity is becoming a 
salient feature of group membership, employed in the public sphere and evolving into a 
political resource, even in societies where it is officially not recognised (like France or 
Germany). 
 39
Chapter 3 
 
Recognition and its limits: comparing inter-ethnic relations and conflicts in the light of 
public discourses and policy-making  
 
 
 
Introduction 
  
This chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which inter-ethnic relations 
and conflicts are framed in public discourse and related central and local state responses. It 
will examine similarities and differences in ‘hot ethnic issues’, by disclosing how they are 
linked to basic stereotypes about ethnic minorities, across the different national contexts with 
relevant case studies as appropriate. The analysis of the ways in which these have been 
represented and the ways in which the policy context of ethnicity has been framed concludes 
in outlining a normative framework of the politics of recognition. 
 
While, notwithstanding the institutionalisation of ethnic minority rights, multiculturalism as a 
normative principle has not gained ground in the Eastern part of Europe, there is a certain 
disillusionment regarding the value of diversity and a backlash in terms of tolerance in 
Western European countries, too. Old and deeply ingrained stereotypes regarding immigrants 
have surfaced, which significantly coalesce with prejudices against Roma, the largest ethnic 
minority in Central and Eastern Europe. Immigrants, just like Roma, are pictured in public 
discourse as cunning, loathsome, unprincipled and likely to swamp national culture (Craig 
2007, Szuhay 1999). Characterisations of the ‘other’ as essentially different, exotic, and even 
barbaric manifest a certain ethnographic appeal, as revealed by a distinguished interest in 
customs and habits, particularly those related to intriguing aspects of sexuality and violence 
(arranged marriages at an early age, the sexual abuse of women, honour killings, etc.). This 
kind of excessive concern about cultural difference, diverging attention from actual social 
problems, affect, in particular, racialised minorities that have become seen as a major 
challenge for integration. In parallel to devising policy responses (affected by and also 
supporting such misguided notions), stereotypes about concerned ethnic minorities become 
(re)invented, largely owing to the media but also to social and cultural sciences. Resulting 
images suggest that these people are reluctant or unable to integrate in society, the labour 
market and the education system, or conform to social norms in general, mainly because they 
are too much tied by out-dated and inadequate traditions, customs and habits. In portraying 
socially excluded and marginalised minorities as backward, premodern and irrational, i.e. 
impossible to manage, the structural reasons of the failure of integration and anti-
discrimination policies remain concealed: the blame lies on the victims. In this framing, the 
responsibility of the state consists in disciplining ethnic minorities by the adoption of ever 
harsher regulations and the introduction of policing methods in order to free society from the 
problems they represent. 
 
These pervasive notions about cultural difference suggest, again, the salience of ‘ethnicity’ as 
a factor (or, rather, a pretext) in explaining differences in social status. The misrecognition of 
minorities demonstrates how discourses and policies are mutually reinforcing and 
legitimising one another. As a result, concerns related to the protection of human and civil 
rights are displaced by anxieties about social integration and cohesion. State policies towards 
minorities, increasingly defined by the needs of national economy and demands for security, 
draw on traditional conceptions of ethnic minorities, present all across Europe, as a political 
or cultural ‘threat’ or a ‘burden’ to the welfare state and society. These two sets of myths 
obscure underlying social and economic problems and the failure of relevant policies. They 
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also serve to legitimise demands for repressive state responses. Thus both the ‘immigrant 
problem’ in Western European states and the ‘Roma problem’ in Central and Eastern Europe 
are seen as the consequence of ‘lenient state control’. 
 
 
3.1 Minorities seen as a ‘threat’ 
 
‘Threat’ is a generic term, expressing aversion, intolerance and xenophobia, which may refer 
to a series of well-known topics employed to characterise immigrants and ethnic minorities 
as, in one or another way, aggressive or dangerous: ‘arriving like a flood’, ‘spreading 
disease’, being ‘deviant’ and ‘sexually abusive’, having ‘criminal inclinations’, representing a 
‘risk for national security’. Although practically any minority may become the target of such 
accusations, socially insecure groups, struggling with poverty and marginalisation, whose 
basic rights are often neglected, are more prone to be collectively seen as a menace.33 While 
certain occurrences may increase the chances of vilification, economic problems, general 
social insecurity and the resulting adverse political climate are also determining in this 
respect. The influence of the state and of dominant political interests is undoubtedly a 
decisive factor in rousing fear mingled with hostility against minorities.34 
 
Case study:  
Wearing the “veil” – the conflation of religious and ethnic identity 
 
Being the second largest religion in most Western European countries, Islam has been in the 
focus of interest for a long time. It has been considered both a challenge and a valuable 
contribution to social diversity. Limited tolerance towards Islam used to be determined by 
core values of Western societies. Thus restrictions on the operations of Islamic private law 
are traditionally based on human rights arguments and the principle of the neutrality of the 
state (i.e. the separation of the state and the Church). However, since the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 and 7/7, other political concerns have replaced these issues. Importantly, not only the 
physical safety of inhabitants is seen to be endangered, but terrorist attacks are also 
understood as being launched against the basic principles of liberal democracies. This shift in 
politics has been accompanied by the re-emergence of the notion of primordial differences 
between “ethnicities” and the spread of the thesis of substantial animosity and inevitable 
conflicts among “cultures”, marked by Huntington’s shallow yet fashionable theory about the 
“clash of civilisations” (Huntington 1996). In the post-9/11 world, Muslim religious practices 
are regarded as a terrain for the growth of terrorism, and any Arab, or even Arab-looking 
person, may be seen as a potential terrorist. Thus the political hysteria around terrorism has 
resulted in the ethnicisation of religious differences. 
 
                                                 
33 A kind of reversed logic seems to apply when particularly vulnerable minorities, deprived of their rights and 
dignity and trying to secure remedies for their injuries, are charged with interfering with national interests. This 
happened when Roma claimants from Hungary brought their case in front of the Strasbourg Court, for which 
they were accused for deliberately damaging the international reputation of their country. The same charges 
were reiterated at the time of the “Roma exodus” from the Czech Republic to Canada and Britain that led to the 
reintroduction of visa requirements. This kind of accusations, as well as the outright criminalisation of 
minorities, function as a super-text to cover unresolved issues of inclusion.  
34 As a form of scapegoating mechanisms, criminalisation of minorities emerges especially in times of economic 
depression and social crisis. (For instance, Hungary is experiencing today, in February 2009, an extremely 
massive attack against Roma, based on the resurgence of the topos of Roma criminality, involving the 
consideration of tough policies not only on crime but also concerning welfare provisions, as well as the 
reemergence of a kind of racist or racially underpinned discourse that consciously transgresses all norms of 
political correctness.  
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Therefore, in comparing incidents related to the highly symbolic issue of the Muslim 
headscarf, one has to take into account dominant ideologies, legal/institutional settings and 
previous inter-ethnic relations, as well as the time when conflicts unfolded in individual 
states.  
 
The only legitimate way of representation in France, as guaranteed by its Constitution, is 
framed in terms of rights concerning religious practices. In spite of the creation of a “French 
Islam” in the 1990s, Muslims in France have not found effective and consensual means of 
common cultural and religious expression, and divisions according to nationality and origin 
have remained. Related to this disunity, there is much confusion about religious, cultural, 
national and social dimensions of minority representation. In the French context, the “veil 
issue”, taking place in secondary schools in the mid-1980s, was primarily seen as a threat to 
the principle of secularism. However, already at that time, the growing significance of Islam 
was considered dangerous also for encouraging violent actions (while regarded, at the same 
time as a means of pacification of social tensions, too). Eventually, the debate led to the 
hardening of the principle forbidding the expression of religious beliefs in public spaces. 
 
Islamic associations and movements in Denmark, established mostly at the initiative of 
second generation immigrants in the 1990s, were also viewed with considerable unease. Part 
of the criticisms regarded the oppressive and anti-egalitarian character of family life and 
gender roles. Such arguments, however, loose some of their persuasiveness when viewed 
having in mind restrictive immigration policies,35 or in the context of the main themes 
covered by the media36. The outspoken nature and alleged radicalism of Islamic activists also 
provoked heated media debates and public controversies. Muslim organisations, at the same 
time, were seen by some people as fostering religious pluralism. A kind of duality of 
perspectives characterises the approaches to the problem of Muslim headscarf as well: while 
it used to be seen in terms of discrimination (i.e. Muslim women wearing the headscarf had 
problems in getting and keeping a job), it later became interpreted in terms of an integration 
problem (i.e. Muslim women would not take their headscarf off so as to get integrated in the 
labour market and society). When the first cases were tried in the late 1990s, the plaintiffs 
based their claims on the violation of anti-discrimination provisions by employers. However, 
when the dispute was taken to the courtroom again, in 2008, this time it was about whether or 
not a prohibition should be implemented on female judges wearing the headscarf.37 
Undoubtedly, the case of Mohammed cartoons in 2005 did not help creating a favourable 
environment for judging on such matters. 
 
In conformity with international legislation, the operation of Islamic personal law in Britain is 
restricted on the grounds of violating women’s rights. In the age of ‘moderate egalitarian 
multiculturalism,’ defined, for Muslims, by a gradual adoption of their demands and the 
construction of legal and institutional compromises that have led to the acceptance of Muslim 
schools and the gradual introduction of halal food in school meals (see chapter 2), minority 
ethnic claims were judged on their own merit, and were slowly accommodated in state 
policies. The rise of Muslim political agency, however, gave way to increasing worries, and 
became interpreted as a challenge to multiculturalism. After 9/11, and especially 7/7, in turn, 
                                                 
35 Stricter regulations on the possibilities of family reunification in the 1990s reflect a strong normative 
understanding of what correct family life should mean in Danish society, and thus act as a means used in 
assimilationist policies (see also Chapter 2 of this report). 
36 The linked issues of the veil and oppressed ethnic minority women come up in Danish media together with 
stereotypes regarding the sexually aggressive Muslim male, criminal ethnic minorities, and immigrants coming 
like a flood and impossible to integrate. 
37 The debate has also touched on whether or not pupils should be allowed to wear religious headscarfs in public 
schools. 
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multiculturalism itself was discredited as a normative concept for, instead of standing for a 
kind of generous diversity, it became seen as only reinforcing social divisions. In government 
politics, this change was marked by a shift from ‘naïve’ to ‘cynical’ multiculturalism. Attacks 
on multiculturalism followed growing public anger and a desire for retribution, also roused 
by Islamophobic manifestations in the press during the 2000s that built on images of Muslims 
as a homogeneous, different, inferior and inimical social group. As diversity was becoming 
viewed as a destabilising factor, rather than an asset, calls for action to promote social 
cohesion and integration were replacing an emphasis on social inclusion. This tendency has 
gained vigour since the bombing in the London underground, after which the rights and 
perspectives of the White community have become increasingly asserted, and the security 
agenda has turned to be even more strongly associated with community cohesion and 
assimilation than before. Attacks on wearing the ‘veil’ started in this deteriorating policy 
climate of ‘aggressive majoritarianism’. As looking different, in itself, is considered a 
commonsense threat to society and to local community cohesion, the debates resulted in the 
introduction of new guidance in school uniform codes. A disciplinary agenda, manifested in 
punitive polices, has come to replace fundamental race equality and ethnic diversity 
objectives. 
 
One of the sad consequences of 9/11, 7/7 and the case of the Mohammed cartoons is that the 
controversies unfolded around issues of the expression of religious identity and the rights of 
women have become misdirected. Public debates and legal cases in the past used to be fitting 
in a discursive framework defined by issues of human rights, the neutrality of the state and 
religious freedom, though having resonances concerning dangerous “otherness” as well. Such 
alienating notions appear to be retrospectively legitimised by the sad events of the 2000s that 
reinforced a strong linkage between (Islamic) religion and (Arabic, Turkish etc.) ethnicity. By 
today, approaches to the “Muslim issue” have become informed significantly less by core 
democratic values. Instead, political responses are driven by some generalised anxiety about 
the vulnerability of democratic states – while, paradoxically, undermining the artifice of 
democracy. 
 
 
3.2 Minorities seen as a ‘burden’ 
 
The other comprehensive technique employed in discursively distancing immigrants and 
ethnic minorities from majorities is their depiction as a ‘burden’ to society and the welfare 
state. This kind of positioning of minorities is linked to assumptions such as they “do not 
want to work,” are “prone to commit frauds and abuse the social security system” and, 
therefore, they “do not deserve social assistance”. The increasing differentiation and 
conditionality in access to welfare rights, a tendency in policy-making that, in some form, is 
manifested in almost every state covered in this report, reflects the influence of such 
stereotypes, as well as reinforces them. This kind of rhetoric permeates the Scandinavian 
workfare approach that links the eligibility of (especially unemployment) benefits to duties, 
just like current discussions in Hungary and Slovakia about obliging beneficiaries to do 
‘communal work’ and “make work pay”.38 Limiting the possibilities of immigrants 
(especially asylum seekers without a work permit) in having recourse to public funds and 
provisions, while curtailing the admissibility of foreigners to the labour market (in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France), also reflects attempts to protect welfare provisions and the 
                                                 
38 When beneficiaries are required to “give something in exchange” for social support, they often become 
involved in employment programs that are impractical, or even function (and are publicly seen) as a kind of 
punishment. Thus not only the relative disadvantages of those in need of help may grow, but they also suffer 
injuries of disrespect. 
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labour market from onerous outsiders. Such policies are accompanied by hostility against 
ethnic minorities and their frequent accusations as parasites, giving way to specific 
surveillance practices and policing methods. The decentralisation of the administration of 
benefit claims by making local authorities act as redistributing agencies in implementing state 
policies is also a general tendency across Europe, whereby decisions about eligibility are 
easily tainted by the subjective (and often prejudiced) attitudes of local officials.  
 
As a result of these policy changes, anti-discrimination principles are weakened. The 
incidental as well as structural reasons (in particular, the effects of discrimination) of 
destitution, poverty and social exclusion remain ignored often already at the stage of 
conceptualising problems.39 Instead, as dictated by neoliberal individualism, the victims of 
disadvantages and injustices are held responsible for their conditions and required to help 
themselves, or at least give something “in return” for welfare assistance. In condemning 
minorities for their unwillingness or inaptitude to work and make useful contributions to 
society, this approach is interlinked, again, with racialised notions about cultural and ethnic 
difference. The stigmatisation of welfare-dependent ethnic minorities in responding to the 
‘ethnicisation of poverty’ involves an additional insult (pertaining to the sphere of 
recognition), aggravating the original situation (defined by redistributive inequality). Such 
misrecognition practices obviously affect redistributive equality in an adverse manner,40 as 
well as fulfill political functions with respect to enhancing (a racialised form of) community 
cohesion. 
 
Case study:  
Contrasting agendas: Roma as the subject of integration and minority policies – the 
conflation of the social and ethnic dimensions of problems 
 
While Roma achieved recognition for their arts and crafts in the past, and are still famous for 
their “musical talent”, widespread beliefs held all over Europe about Roma ethnicity reveals 
disrespect and devaluation of the cultural assets of Roma populations. Roma culture tends to 
be interpreted in terms of a deviant life-style, requiring policing interventions rather than 
protection. This approach is largely based on the topos of nomadism, which has survived 
despite the (often forced) settlement of Roma communities, and the fact that the migration 
and travelling of Roma (in some Western European states, especially the United Kingdom) is 
often due to the lack of social protections, and caused by difficulties in acquiring land and 
creating a stable livelihood. In becoming subsumed in the categories of a “life-style” 
community or “underclass” (both terms having significant racial connotations), the ability of 
Roma to create values, contributing to the national culture, is contested and denied. More 
specifically, their languages, seen as defective dialects of local languages, are often deemed 
inappropriate for refined communication and the creation of literary works. The legacy of 
forced assimilation during state socialism, involving the suppression of cultural difference, 
represents a particularly significant influence in the background of stereotypes hindering the 
recognition of Roma identity in terms of classical minority rights. However, the 
                                                 
39 The taboo on ethnicity contributes to the misconceptualisation of problems. For instance, the problem of 
integration of North Africans in France was, until recently, called the “urban question”, instead of referring to 
discrimination, ethnic relations or multiculturalism. As a result, the policy of “social mixing,” never clearly 
defined in terms of existing social divisions (significantly marked by ethnicity and race), yet trying to contest 
the menace of communitarianism, had a paradoxical effect. While, in principle, a policy framed in social, rather 
than ethnic, terms, in its actual applications it gained racial overtones in the course of complex and highly 
selective processes. 
40 At the same time, the denial of, or failure in providing, access to public resources entail consequences for the 
capacity of minorities in obtaining social respect. 
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understanding of Roma culture as “backward” (pre-modern and atavistic) basically relies on 
the generic paradigm of the “primitive”.  
 
As a result of disrespect, conceptualisations of the “Roma issue”, whether framed as a social 
or as an ethnic problem, are informed by a negative image of Roma. Public policies are 
hardly able to articulate, or even support, positions which go beyond commonplace ideas 
about Roma regarding their incapacity and disinterest in integration (in the spheres of 
education, the labour market, or the local community and society in general). Such 
essentialised (and racialised) notions, used as explanatory motifs, neglect and normalise (or 
legitimise) discrimination in declaring Roma virtually impossible to integrate (and 
assimilate). Thus, as opposed to a vulnerable social group in need of social assistance, they 
become portrayed as a burden to society by their own fault. For instance, it is often claimed 
that the social protection system is not just impotent but also harmful with regard of 
integrating Roma (that is to say, cutting benefits would make seeking a job more attractive 
for them). In this way, the real achievements of state socialism in this respect (proving the 
ability of Roma to integrate, though not securing them the appropriate conditions for 
obtaining stable and fair positions in society) are buried into oblivion, just like reminiscences 
of similarity between Roma and other poor people, both in terms of living conditions and 
habits or lifestyle. Instead, memories about Roma isolation and “inferiority” determine 
popular attitudes, restricting possibilities for integration (Jurová 2005). 
 
As a socially excluded population and a national minority, Roma are subject of two distinct 
strands of policies: integration and the promotion of minority rights. While the former 
requires an approach that can be termed as a ‘politics of equality’, the latter can be framed 
like a ‘politics of difference’. The two kinds of politics, though theoretically separable, may 
create insidious confluences and confusions in actual implementations. Apart from the 
generic concern of states regarding the risks involved in enhancing the autonomy of national 
minorities – ultimately: secession –, which (excepting Romania) is presently not a relevant 
issue in the countries discussed here, a politics of difference may contradict, or at least 
weaken, efforts towards social integrity in other ways as well. The issue of Roma is a good 
case in point.  
 
The conceptualisation of social justice regarding the redistribution and recognition aspects of 
harms suffered by discriminated communities (a theoretical framework developed by Nancy 
Fraser) suggests that these two elements are interconnected, rather than being antithetical, 
even though they often lead to contradictions in practice (Fraser 2000). Thus in interpreting 
the problems of a particular minority and determining the right course of action, public 
policies should be simultaneously attentive to the socio-cultural and the political-economic 
sources of problems, and devise political solutions that address the interests of the given 
group in this dual framework. This, however, has not been accomplished regarding Roma 
minorities in the Central and Eastern European region, whose needs as an ethnic minority and 
as a socially excluded and poverty-stricken population are addressed by distinct and unrelated 
groups of policies. At the same time, due to the reconceptualisation of the “Roma issue” 
(regarded as a social problem during state socialism, manageable exclusively by means of 
social policies) as an inter-ethnic conflict, the ethnicity paradigm prevails in both policy 
fields. Thus the social difficulties faced by Roma get subsumed in the “ethnic problem.” 
Meanwhile, the tendency to reduce social justice to the sphere of redistribution and reclassify 
cultural questions as social problems, leading to interventions against Roma covered up in 
terms of assistance to integrate, also survives in traces. The confusion between the two 
dimensions, created, in particular, by focusing on consequences rather than causes, leads to 
inadequate definitions as to the sources and nature of particular situations, inhibiting the 
identification of appropriate solutions (Fraser 2000, Laubeova 2001, Zamfir and Zamfir 
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1993). As a result, not only the social inclusion of Roma is thwarted, but they also suffer 
disadvantages with regard of the promotion of their culture and identity, i.e. recognition as an 
ethnic minority (Szalai 2003). 
 
Roma are principally subject of integration and social inclusion policies meant to improve 
their social conditions, while the central recognition aspect of their maltreatment – namely, 
stigmatisation, – inadvertently reinforced by these very policies, remains unacknowledged. 
The complex problems Roma are facing as a discriminated minority are not addressed by 
equally complex measures. On the one hand, this means that the various kinds of policies 
(related to the labour market, education, etc.) are rarely represented together in the framework 
of comprehensive programs. On the other hand, policies are not designed appropriately to 
address the central problem, i.e. discrimination, which keeps the dynamic of social exclusion 
in motion. Instead of going into details about the overall failure of integration policies, let us 
only note that it also has to do with difficulties of definition and targeting. As colour blind 
policies represent the prevailing paradigm in Central and Eastern Europe (affirmative action 
type of remedies are virtually non-existent)41, and also because of legal prohibitions and 
restrictions concerning the registration of ethnicity, the category of Roma must be 
circumscribed. Such restrictive measures may be entirely legitimate, nevertheless, they also 
contribute to the difficulties in grasping and tackling the key dimension or source of 
discrimination, i.e. ethnicity. While the avoidance of the ethnic classification of the 
population certainly has advantages (ethnicity is not reified), the simultaneous use of a 
variety of ways in categorising Roma as beneficiaries of different kinds of policies may lead 
to mistaken substitutions and thus result in a terminological chaos, which acts against the 
efficiency of policies (e.g. Frištenská and Višek 2002). Moreover, categories applied by 
targeted policies (like “permanently unemployed”, people in a “multiply disadvantaged 
situation”, or students “in need of special education”) are also seen as having stigmatising 
effects by the people concerned (Zsigó 2005). In addition, the few existing targeted policies 
(intended to improve a disadvantaged region or help families of substandard income) are 
often unduly seen as “Roma policies”, nourishing old myths about Roma as a “privileged” 
social group.42 In this way, present efforts, pertaining to the “politics of equality,” are not 
only ineffective in the case of Roma but, mistakenly, frequently seen by the general public as 
representing a kind of “politics of difference” (i.e. privileging the Roma). In reality, even 
specifically Roma policies notoriously fail to reach the Roma and produce results, while their 
negative ‘recognition effects’ only curtail the chances of a positive affirmation of Roma 
identity and the attainment of social respect. 
 
As a national minority, the Roma are also subject to legislations on minorities, involving 
specific rights and participation in special institutions. Support for promoting Roma culture 
and identity is especially important considering the depreciation of Roma cultural values by 
society as well as with view of the role of culture and identity in political mobilisation. 
However, given their significant social disadvantages, Roma are often unable to enforce their 
rights and utilise their institutional opportunities to the same extent as other minorities. At the 
same time, the (re)construction of Roma culture is also seen as a cultural response to 
                                                 
41 The few exceptions to this rule are represented mainly by certain educational policies involving the provision 
of grants and scholarship, etc. While reservations against specialised policies and programs for Roma as 
reinforcing ethnic divides are sound and legitimate, the main obstacles in the way of such initiatives seems to be 
connected with the lack of social solidarity, manifested in the stereotype of “privileging Roma”. 
42 What is more, even general public policies that concern (among others) Roma are regarded as unduly 
favouring Roma, while, in fact, they might be discriminatory against them. Thus the universal system of family 
allowances in Hungary or Slovakia, insensitive to the financial situation of beneficiaries, is seen as being abused 
by Roma who are supposed to regard it as the major means of subsistance, while their share of provisions is 
actually unfair with respect to their significantly lower avarage income. 
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constraints and limited opportunities (Wilson 1993). The fact that the sources of 
disadvantages (namely racism, discrimination and segregation) are not effectively addressed 
within this framework is a significant problem. What is more, in consolidating the status and 
image of Roma as an ethnic minority, separate and different from the majority, without 
providing them appropriate means for interest representation, the present institutional 
framework of minority rights, circumventing the problems of discrimination and racism, 
entails further risks with respect to the very problems Roma are struggling with. The 
recognition of Roma as representing a distinct ethnicity and culture is, therefore, problematic 
and ambivalent. Instead of remedying recognition injuries by way of instituting equal respect, 
the present ‘politics of (cultural and ethnic) difference’ in the case of Roma might generate 
further social and political inequalities and lead to the reinforcement of their separation and 
marginalisation.  
 
Neither of these policy strands – the one related to integration and the other to minority rights 
– has been effective in eliminating discrimination, while both have engendered further 
inequalities in relations of recognition as well as redistribution. As a result, Roma populations 
are facing a deadlock, writhing between the Scylla of a politics of equality and the Charybdis 
of a politics of difference.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion: Towards a more comprehensive understanding of recognition 
 
The limitations of recognition politics are partly political (i.e. determined by contrasting 
interests), partly conceptual (related to notions about culture, religion and ethnicity, as well as 
ideas about the nation and the state), and partly inherent (having to do with the mechanisms 
of recognition). Conflicts over recognition, as well as redistribution, determine political 
limitations (also relevant for the recognition aspects of redistributive policies) that, on the 
part of the state, are principally marked by perceived national interests. Prevailing discourses 
on cultural, religious and ethnic difference and ideologies about the constitution of the nation 
and the state define conceptual limitations (also informed by particular political interests). 
Finally, the inevitable moment of essentialism (contradicting contemporary theories of 
identity formation and the view of identities as being constantly changing (Hall 1992, Gilroy 
1993) and simplification (what is actually being recognised can not be simply translated to 
identities) represent the inherent or structural limitation of recognition politics. 
 
Policies (even those related to redistribution) have recognition effects (Fraser 2000). 
Disrespect of ethnic minority rights is, among other factors, owing to misconceived or 
harmful notions concerning the character of ethnic minority groups and the nature of inter-
group relations.43 Such notions, which are partly the products of previous and current policies 
(that are often inconsistent and contradictory), and partly supported by powerful discourses, 
have implications both on recognition and redistribution. The current politics on minorities 
enforces particular ways of categorising minorities, which, in turn, affect the self-conceptions 
(or identities) of minority as well as majority groups and thus inter-ethnic relations, too. 
 
Recognition discourse easily yields to essentialism, because the language used in political 
struggles and conceptions informing the structure of institutions favour simplistic notions of 
culture and identity. “Culture” as a term used in public policies has a broad scope of 
reference, including “life-style” that is often determined by social conditions, or perceptions 
                                                 
43 This is reflected, for instance, in criticisms of British ’race relations’ policies that are seen as reinforcing the 
racialisation of social relations (i.e. racial divisions are actively created by policies concerned with challenging 
racism). 
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about religious practices, etc. These terms of reference are constructed by people in the 
position of power, who are often outsiders. Biological and cultural determinism is haunting in 
the background of such constructions that become the starting point for policy-making. As a 
result of powerful discourses and policies, groups (i.e. boundaries between social entities) are 
reinforced (or sometimes created). Amidst multiple and ever-changing references to their 
nature and characteristics, as well as due to the impacts of policies they are affected by, the 
actual constitution of minority groups remains ambiguous, fuzzy and untraceable.  
 
Recognition, in these circumstances, may also mean the acknowledgment of authoritatively 
imposed boundaries and the appreciation of a minority culture in terms set by outsiders. In 
this case, it actually involves a great deal of misrecognition. Politically speaking, 
misrecognition is a form of injury as well as a potential motive and grounds for social 
mobilisation and collective action (Honneth 1996). In current politics, cultural or religious 
membership (or its essentialised constructions and understandings) is both seen as a source of 
conflict or political challenge and as a political resource. In these capacities (cf. ‘strategic 
essentialism’), ethnicity is employed in social movements claiming for the recognition (of the 
needs, interests or identities) of minorities and state policies in responding to such claims 
and/or dealing with national or international security problems, alike. 
 
Importantly, problems with recognition do not necessarily and always involve the non-
recognition of cultural distinctiveness. Excessive attention paid to cultural difference is also a 
type of recognition harm. Cultural (ethnic or religious) difference is too often 
overemphasised, as if cultures were homogeneous and mutually exclusive wholes. As a 
matter of fact, culture is constantly in transition and inherently partial (Bhabha 1996). Not 
acknowledging this is also a kind of misrecognition. Moreover, in several social and policy 
contexts, members of minorities affected by racism and discrimination might opt for the non-
recognition of their ethnic distinctiveness.44 At the same time, in designing policies (or 
starting social movements) to address these very problems, the collective identity of 
concerned groups should be reconceptualised to incorporate experiences of subordination, 
discrimination, social exclusion and marginalisation.45 In this way, inter-ethnic conflicts that 
are usually interpreted as a result of differences between particular cultures can be 
reconceptualised in terms of exclusion and inclusion. This perspective offers an insight into 
issues of structure and power, allowing for the analysis of intersectionality, and promotes the 
adoption of a transnational perspective. Thus an appropriate politics of recognition has to be 
conceived of as a comprehensive project, taking into account the dangerous imputations of 
difference as well as the pernicious conflation of distinct dimensions of identity, in order to 
prevent the unfair treatment of minorities and the harmful reinforcement of social divides. 
 
 
                                                 
44 The denial of opportunities of assimilation can be interpreted as a kind of recognition-related harm. Besides, 
when assimilation is unavailable, the positive recognition of cultural difference is unfeasible, too. 
45 This is especially difficult in countries, like France and to a lesser extent Germany, where ethnicity and race 
are not recognised categories (race is - for evident reasons -  absolutely discredited in Germany). At the same 
time, these issues are present in latent forms. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The state of the art in research on inter-ethnic relations and minorities across selected 
European countries  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Comparison of state of the art research on inter-ethnic relations and minorities shows some 
clear differences and distinctions between old and new EU member states. This chapter draws 
on this broad division, arising from the different historical development of these two groups 
of states, to examine key trends and themes, and also considers the extent to which 
commonalities exist in research in this field more generally.     
 
Selected old EU member states: Great Britain, Germany, France, Denmark and Sweden 
 
Old member states have a much longer continuous established tradition of social research as 
such and their experience in researching migrants and the constitution of new ethnic 
minorities is deeper and covers a longer period. France and Great Britain, being countries 
with a colonial past, have longer experience with immigration of, especially, culturally 
different and racialised groups. Despite this, it is chiefly Great Britain that has historically 
developed a more advanced set of approaches for studying (cultural) strangers. Anthropology 
and ethnography of foreign cultures operated in colonised contexts did not only serve 
scientific purposes, but also the needs of dominating powers (Talal 1973). Nevertheless, the 
turn towards researching post-colonial strangers is above all a British tradition. But British 
studies on inter-ethnic relations have moved through a focus on the sociology of race 
relations to a focus on the inter-related sociologies of racism, ethnicity and migration, with 
some attempts to build an integrated framework for these approaches. 
 
In France, in spite of its colonial past and the fact that it has been an immigrant country for 
several decades, research on minorities and interethnic relations used to be marginal for a 
long time. Its development has however been rapid in the last twenty years. The “invisibility” 
of ethnic groups, both in public discourse and research, derives from the political conception 
of French republican citizenship (Noiriel 1988). Questions concerning ethnic origin are 
considered irrelevant. Ethnic origin (similarly to religion) is regarded as unimportant and, 
hence, it must not be significant for participation in a public sphere that should be indifferent 
to these questions. In France, despite some symbolic moves toward acknowledging diversity, 
the issue of examining and researching ethnicity have not yet been resolved (Jennings 2000). 
For those who advocate research on the social significance of ethnicity, this move is seen as 
aiding policy approaches to the precarious and marginal position of a range of migrant and 
minority groups in France. Those who oppose researching and collecting data on ethnicity 
claim that, on the contrary, it will lead to the reinforcement of xenophobia, resentment and 
hostility, leading to the erosion of civic solidarity due to the awakening and mobilisation of 
ethnic particularism and related claims for recognition and identity.    
 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden have experienced immigration and growing ethnic 
differentiation since the 1960s. This changing social context led to the development of related 
research from the 1970s onwards. However, there was a boom in this work during the 1990s, 
when the questions of immigration became more broadly debated in public discourse – 
among other things in connection with the breakdown of state socialist regimes and the 
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expected radical growth of emigration from these countries into the EU. Germany, Great 
Britain and France have become analytical models/types for different conceptions of civic 
integration. Also, a track record of comparative studies looking at these and other countries 
has been well established (e.g. Brubaker 1994). Discussions about the similarities and 
differences of, for example, British and French multiculturalism have been a particular focus 
of study. Another important topic of comparative studies is different conceptions of the 
founding of civic identity (and rights) and its openness towards immigrants, which is 
connected with the legal conceptions of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of 
the blood) represented in the French and German civil-political traditions (e.g. Castles and 
Davidson 2000).   
 
Research agendas and perspectives 
 
The leading authors in this field come, particularly, from Germany and Great Britain. French 
theorists are cited less frequently. However, authors such as Bourdieu and Foucault are of 
great importance. They provide a general interpretative framing for a great number of these 
studies, especially those based on a critical tradition of social research (e.g. critical studies on 
transnationalism). The objects of research are, above all, immigrants and their descendants 
coming from non-European countries and also Europeans coming from non-EU states, 
particularly from the Balkans and post-Soviet states. Classical topics seem to be questions 
concentrated around the issues of immigration, integration and citizenship, developed into 
several sub-topics:  
 
• economic incorporation (labour market position and dynamics) 
• education (access, achievement and outcomes) 
• spatial segregation (housing market position and residential dynamics) 
• assessment of policies focusing on the integration of foreigners 
• patterns of racism and associated attitudes, discriminatory practices and violence 
by the domestic population  
• cultural patterns and practices of ethnic minorities  
• stigmatisation of minorities connected with the provision of  welfare  
• barriers of access to public services    
• discourses about the representation and images of minorities (news and media 
coverage) 
• forms and barriers of political participation of minorities   
• theoretical/conceptual work dealing with inclusion/exclusion of immigrants and 
minorities 
• evaluation of the role of law in dealing with ethnic and cultural differences and 
customs, racial and ethnic discrimination and minority rights 
• analysis of the roles of ethnic networks, patterns of ethnic mobilisation and 
claims-making  
• transnationalism and cross-national diasporas 
• hybridisation of cultural forms and ethnic identities 
 
These research topics, examined across a range of national and international contexts, show 
that analysis of the forms of inclusion/exclusion and inter-ethnic relations are 
multidimensional and form an increasingly complex nexus of work (e.g. Vertovec 2006).     
 
The impact of post-structural and post-modern thinking on this field has led to the widespread 
utilisation of the critique of cultural, racial and ethnic essentialism and a critical challenge to 
associated claims for commonality and purity of groups. Another principal shift has involved 
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a move away from explanations and interpretations which unnecessarily privilege cultural 
and ethnic difference, with a concern to build a multi-causal, macro account of the structural 
position of minorities and migrants in the analysis of ethnic exclusion. There has also been an 
accumulating track record of evidence on the nature, depth and extent of racial, ethnic, 
national and religious discrimination, and also racial and ethnic violence and conflict.  
 
 
Selected new EU member states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia 
 
Three key factors have shaped research in new EU member states in the field of inter-ethnic 
relations. Firstly, the inquiry of social science during state socialism was not free, and a 
number of problems, including ethnicity, could not be conceptualised as social conflicts 
appropriate for investigation, as this was out of accord with the official ideology and 
propaganda. Secondly, immigration as a social phenomenon in these countries became a 
major concern after the regimes’ breakdown, which had previously restricted the free 
movement of people. Thirdly, historically, most European states built up their nations on the 
basis of ethnically diverse communities, and the construction of nationalism involved 
attempts at assimilation and suppression of ethnic identities. In the new EU member states, 
ethnic tensions, claims and conflicts were re-born and re-invigorated in the 1990s, for 
example, due to the co-existence of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia. 
Nevertheless, the major problem for these four countries is the pattern of ethnic relations 
between the majority group and Roma fellow-citizens. Moreover, after 2000, the Czech 
Republic has become an important target country for Ukrainian and Vietnamese immigrants, 
whose number has grown significantly. It is also necessary to notice that research into these 
topics has also had a constitutive character for social science, as in Hungary and partly in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia cultural/social anthropology has to a great extent become 
established through studying the Roma. In Romania, the tradition of studying the Roma had 
been well-established before WWII. However, the origins of more systematic approaches 
appeared in most countries first in the 1960s (former Czechoslovakia) and the 1970s 
(Hungary), with a number of research studies focusing on ethnographic and folklore topics 
(e.g. Horváthová 1964). Well-founded systematic research only began to develop after the 
state socialist regime‘s breakdown. In the 1990s, however, research in this field had to 
manage several problems resulting from the former isolation from up-to-date debates in 
social science. This gap was rapidly closed post-2000, with topics and approaches in this field 
more closely aligned to those in old Western EU countries.  
 
In the 1990s, some research in Slovakia, Hungary and Romania interpreted the 
marginalisation of the Roma by referring to cultural patterns that were stigmatised by the 
majority population. Therefore, they saw the main cause of inter-ethnic tensions in “cultural 
incompatibility” or in “social deviation”. Cultural interpretations were, due to findings which 
could not be ignored, gradually exchanged for the emphasis on social-economic deprivation 
and immiseration of the Roma population. By referring to unequal access to welfare, 
education, labour market and housing, the research perspective has moved towards adopting a 
critical approach when studying the processes of minority exclusion, and, just like in old EU 
member states, the significance of the marginal position of ethnic minorities is evident in 
patterns of discrimination, xenophobia, and racism (e.g. Vašečka and Vašečka 2003). This 
shift, however, has not only resulted from internal development in social science in these 
countries, but is also due to the resourcing and support of this area of study from abroad.  
 
In this sensitive area of interethnic relations, a complex range of research initiators and 
funders can be identified. State institutions conducting public policy are, consequently, an 
important initiator of research, except in France, where policy on collecting ethnicity related 
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data constrains such activity. The “counterbalance” to research initiated by states is 
represented by studies supported or conducted by NGO subjects, although state funding may 
be significant in supporting these activities. International organisations, such as the World 
Bank, the UN and the EU itself have also contributed to the development of research on 
ethnicity and exclusion. Although there are different traditions and approaches in research on 
inter-ethnic relations and minorities between individual states and groups of states (i.e. old 
and new EU member states), there is now increasing convergence due to patterns of funding, 
increasing comparative work and expanding cross-national research activities. 
 
 
Under-investigated issues  
 
The position of the Roma minority is a common subject of research in the selected new EU 
member states but there is a need for reflection regarding the fact that the “Roma” as an 
ethnic group is a construction by majority societies (and new Roma elites), for the Roma 
represent a heterogeneous social group sharing various sub-identities. Other under-
investigated issues include processes of spatial segregation and every-day life in “ghettoised” 
communities. For example, in the Slovak case, until now only one in-depth qualitative study 
by anthropologists Hirt and Jakoubek (2008) has been published on this subject.    
 
Important gaps exist between research and policymaking. For example, in the Czech case, 
research on ethnicity has often not been applied enough to the broader political and socio-
economic context and related issues. This may be due to the lack of relevant statistical data 
which is a common problem across many countries examined here (see Chapter 1 discussion 
on categorising ethnicity). Lack of appropriate data on ethnicity and evidence on patterns of 
racial and ethnic discrimination partly inhibits the construction of anti-discrimination 
agendas. Moreover, new EU member states deal with a related problem: the lack of reliable 
data regarding welfare policies and their impact on Roma families. 
 
The theme of welfare policies and, more generally, of the relations between the ethnic 
minorities and the welfare state is identified especially in the Scandinavian context, 
particularly regarding the strategies of migrants coming from non-EU countries to Denmark 
and Sweden. Regarding their orientation towards trans-national relations, the studies 
published in Scandinavia (Olwig and Hastrup 1997, Olsson 2007) are similar to those 
published in Britain, and partly also to those published in France and in Germany. In the 
countries of CEE this perspective is not present, which may be due to the fact that migration 
is only a recent topic of study. This may also be the reason why much more attention is paid 
in Western Europe and Scandinavia to global relations such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict than in CEE.  
 
A notorious lack of evidence on segregation and education is noticeable across these 
countries. This problem is explicitly mentioned as a theme relevant for further research in the 
Romanian, British and French cases. Other reports do not mention this absence directly but 
the relevance of this kind of research in other countries is evident. French science lacks 
qualitative research in schools in problematic neighbourhoods with an explicit focus on the 
role that ethnicity plays both in external social labelling and in the operation of inter-
subjective perceptions and experiences.  
 
In the UK research on ethnicity has been partly driven by some key intellectual concerns, 
including a historic neglect of gender, and a failure to both address intersectionality and 
racial, ethnic and cultural homogenisation and essentialism, with a concern to unpack racial 
categories and develop a more nuanced account of ethnic differentiation, gender differences 
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and generational differences. There is increasing research interest in challenging the 
conventional use of ethnic categories through exploration of diversity within and between 
ethnic communities, as society is becoming more diverse due to changing patterns of 
migration and globalisation. This is exemplified in the new series of community studies being 
carried out by the Runnymede Trust, which continue a long tradition in British sociology. 
This latest series has explored the lives of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, South African, Vietnamese 
and Romanian migrants to the UK. 
 
Despite the differences between analysed states and their research traditions, there are 
common questions that are perceived as under-investigated issues. In selected new EU-
member states a deficit in the research of the impact of social policy on ethnic minorities is 
evident. In selected old EU-member states this sphere is investigated in much broader scope. 
However, it is necessary to take another step: to better understand how social policy and 
political strategies of the integration of ethnic minorities produce new and unintended forms 
of social exclusion. After several years of research, it is obvious that integration of ethnic 
minorities and reproduction of inequalities are influenced and structured on many levels that 
intersect with each other. However, there is no generally accepted and appropriate analytical 
perspective taking this complexity into account. Studies dedicated to migration, integration 
and interethnic relations in the European context could benefit from greater inter-disciplinary 
work. The necessity of multi-methodological, cross-national analysis is explicitly expressed 
in the French report. It states that until now there has been no work done that could be 
compared in this regard with the studies of Sayad (1999), the author of studies dedicated to 
Algerian migration from many points of view of different social science disciplines. Even if 
similar necessity is not mentioned in other reports, it is not out of place to state that the 
example of Sayad is also relevant to the other scientific traditions. However, the aim of social 
research is not only to study social phenomena in their complexity, intersectionality and 
multidisciplinarity. We also face an epistemological challenge of how to overcome 
methodological nationalism (a use of national contexts as the basic unit of analysis) (Wimmer 
and Glick-Schiller 2003, Beck and Sznaider 2006), which is a great obstacle to understanding 
the processes of minoritisation in Europe.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The ongoing importance of ethnicity in a range of formal and informal contexts has been 
established. Why certain social contexts over-determine, or make ethnicity of high 
importance, and why others under-determine or reduce the significance of ethnicity, together 
with examination of the ethnic difference in varying regional, national and local 
circumstances are central questions for this study. The nature and complexity of relations 
between the movement of people (migration), the formation of boundaries between groups of 
people who have shared cultural meanings, memories and descent (ethnicity) and the 
formation and negative treatment of racial groups (racism) has been examined. Migration, 
racism and ethnicity remain strong social forces and there is evidence of sharpening tensions 
and conflict in inter-ethnic relations Two key forms of ethnicity are examined in this study: 
migrant workers and their descendants forming strong ethnic communities, for example 
Turks in Germany or Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK, and the Roma. These groups are 
subject to discriminatory practices in their everyday life, with many being particularly 
vulnerable to such exclusionary behaviour in the spheres of employment, housing, education 
and in interactions with the police. The selected ethnic minority groups chosen for study here 
indicate a varied hierarchy of ethnic differentials with the Roma in the most vulnerable and 
marginal position, although systematic comparison from individual country reports is 
difficult and necessitates the primary data collection being carried out in this project. This is 
due primarily to the lack of symmetry in the categorisation of ethnicity and systems of data 
collection and analysis across European countries. The macro, meso and micro contexts 
which collectively frame majority responses to these minority groups are highly dynamic 
with for example, changing migration flows, global conflicts, media images and national 
debates. Despite this changing context, levels of discrimination and hostility have been high 
and relatively stable and the resulting perception across many groups and communities of 
systemic negative treatment has a range of significant effects including alienation and 
political mobilisation. Increasing recognition of minority rights has accompanied increasing 
ethnic minority mobilisation. Although forms and levels vary across these countries it is clear 
that minority claims-making and, often inadequate and partial, national political and policy 
responses together with significant levels of majority hostility are common features. 
Multiculturalism as a normative principle has not gained ground in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and is under attack in the West. The value of diversity is in question and there is a 
majority backlash to values of tolerance. At the same time the rhetoric of equality is evident 
in integration and non-discrimination interventions, yet they have failed to deliver significant 
reductions in inequalities and sustained political recognition of minority rights. Education has 
been a key battleground in which these mainstream and minority claims and positions have 
been articulated and utilised in political struggles and policy debates. Beneath the politics of 
race and ethnicity, our selected ethnic minority groups have drawn creatively on their cultural 
distinctiveness and identity to formulate differential responses to these circumstances. The 
identification of these strategies is a key focus for fieldwork on local communities which 
forms a later part of this project. 
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